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ABSTRACT
This study investigated what determines successful transatlantic defense policy
cooperation and how that cooperation can reduce the military capability gap between the United
States and its European NATO allies. It examines the differing defense policies and defense
capabilities between the United States and its European NATO allies. Several theories in
International Relations were also used as a foundation for the argument that cooperation is
needed. The approach to defense policy is very different between the United States and Europe.
The strategic vision of the world of both parties differs as well. Policy, doctrine and defense
projects are all taken into consideration and analyzed. Based on the results of the analysis of
policy and doctrines, the policy recommendation is that there should be more cooperation on
defense policy planning, military doctrine and defense projects conducted in the effective fashion
of current successful cases. The European NATO members will also need to cooperate on such
policy if the military capability gap is to be lessened.
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CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION

Research Theory and Hypothesis

The research question of this project is that the military capability gap between
the United States and its European NATO allies can be reduced by cooperation between the
governments of the states involved and the defense industries of those states. As it will be
explained, the capability gap has been a long time in the making and will not be rectified in the
short term. However there have been cases of successful transatlantic defense project
cooperation that has not only strengthened the military capability of individual states, but NATO
on the whole as well.
The main research question is: What will determine successful transatlantic
defense policy cooperation? The primary hypothesis is that a coherent policy framework for
defense planning and doctrine determines successful cooperation, which requires there to be
clearly defined goals and requirements for the policy, along with the flexibility to meet the needs
of all parties involved. The secondary hypothesis of this project is that if there is successful
transatlantic defense project cooperation, the military capability gap between the United States
and its European NATO allies will close. The independent variable is the successful defense
projects and the dependent variable is the military capability gap between the United States and
its European NATO allies. The study is important for several reasons. The first is that if NATO
is to remain relevant and able to protect its members, strong military capability is needed. The
1

second is that if European NATO members become more militarily capable they will be able to
defend themselves independently, which can not only create better transatlantic relations, but it
can also allow for even more defense project cooperation. Thirdly, it means the survival of
NATO as an alliance. If NATO is not militarily capable of facing the full spectrum of warfare,
then it will not be effective in its missions, present and future.
History and Background

When examining the last fifty or so years of history, there appear to be one
prominent event that heralds the course world events in an almost prophetic manner. This key
event was the outcome of World War II and how that outcome was achieved. With the victory of
the United States and its allies over Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the United States was
catapulted into the leadership role, which it maintains today. It will be obvious to some how a
conventional war is fought and won, but World War II witnessed the emergence of war fought in
a manner not experienced before. Many advances may be credited to the German military with
such firsts as effectively implementing mechanized infantry, tank warfare and the jet warplane. It
is then ironic that all of these advances were eventually seized upon and capitalized by the U.S.
military, perfected and utilized against Germany itself and its subsequent enemies. Consequently,
with the end of World War II, American power in the world has been mainly defined by its
military power. The U.S. military strength is so unrivaled that no other state dare risk a
conventional war with the U.S., including Russia. Perhaps this is the primary reason why
asymmetric threats have surfaced against the U.S. Asymmetric threats are the one method
attempting to counter U.S. military power, if it can be countered at all.
2

From the initial days of American involvement in World War II, the path the United
States would take in respect to military power may be traced and its lineage may be witnessed
today in its evolved form. The origin of the strength of the U.S. military is the defense industry
where the weapons and systems of the military are researched, designed and refined. The
American defense industry is second to none in the world. The products manufactured by the
American defense industry are unsurpassed in roughly every facet from navy destroyers to jet
fighters. Europe on the other hand has, since the end of World War II, successfully recovered
from the massive destruction and its defense industry is highly competitive. However, it pales in
comparison to the massive lead that the America defense industry maintains. In light of these
issues, the most active military in NATO, with the most resources committed, understandably is
the United States. The U.S. military is in fact the one true world-wide military power in NATO.
The remaining members of NATO rely on U.S. air and sea lifts in order to conduct NATO
missions. In combat situations, with the lack of a comparable European defense industry, the
European forces in combat in areas of operations such as Afghanistan are at a disadvantage when
compared to their American counterparts. From close air support to armored vehicles, the
European militaries are measurable steps behind.
It should not be a revelation that the U.S. holds the lead in military power in the
world given the fact that for fifty years the U.S. and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war.
With the end of the Cold War, many militaries were down-sized, including the U.S. The United
States continued to forge ahead with research and development to prepare its military to engage
in the next war and not the last, as was the case for a number of states before World War II.
With the attacks of September 11th, 2001 the U.S. defense industry was given a new mission and
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propelled into a new era of armed conflict. Since 9/11, the military budget of the U.S. has
hovered at approximately $500 billion. This considerable budget is more than the entire
European defense budget combined. In fact, the closest NATO ally of the U.S. in military
spending is the United Kingdom which spends just over 1/10th of the U.S.’s budget. It is arguably
the second best military in the world with respect to its capabilities, many of which are similar to
those of the U.S. but on a somewhat lesser scale. Consequently, with states such as the U.K.
which have increased military spending, they have cooperated in trans-Atlantic joint military
projects to facilitate bridging the power gap since 9/11. Most of Europe realizes that there are
looming new threats; however, it will necessitate some time to analyze if there has been any
significant action taken on their part to better secure their own defense. However the recent order
of two new and advanced aircraft carried by the U.K. is a sign of a step in the appropriate
direction.
Speaking of signs of progress in European defense, there are a few slivers of hope
in Europe which demonstrates that there is hope for the European defense industry and the state
of European military capability. A quick look at these new bastions of hope has taken form in
either trans-Atlantic cooperation in defense, or European internal cooperation in defense. On the
trans-Atlantic side, the Joint Strike Fighter program has witnessed the cooperation between the
United States and the United Kingdom on building a revolutionary warplane that may be
produced in three variants to serve the respective air forces, navies and Marine Corps. The
capabilities of this aircraft will provide its operators a distinct advancement and advantage in
war-fighting capability over the current generation of warplanes. The JSF is the premier example
of trans-Atlantic cooperation in defense. On the European side, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the
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next generation of advanced air superiority aircraft for Europe was developed by France,
Germany, Spain, Italy and the U.K. This is one of many examples of European cooperation on
common weapons and defense. Yet with advanced programs similar to that of the Eurofighter
Typhoon, the Eurocopter Tiger, the NHI NH90, and the ARTEC Boxer there must be more
integration of research, development, and production of European weapons systems.
One of the reasons why the U.S. military is as capable as the wars from Kosovo to
Iraq have shown is that the technology and systems used is top notch. If Europe is to increase its
military capabilities, which may been seen as an unavoidable requirement for NATO cooperation
and European defense, there must be a united front on the European defense industry side of
operations. There exists some cooperation already, but their level of product capability continues
to lag behind that of U.S. or trans-Atlantic product capability. Because of this lack of capability,
Europe and NATO on a whole have become less capable to perform its mission, as seen in
Afghanistan. Consequently, NATO has become an alliance of the U.S. and others with everyone
else providing either some assistance or just token assistance. Also, with the ever changing
doctrines of fighting modern war, the U.S. holds the lead in the area of adapting to new threats.
An example of this is the U.S. lead in the development of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles. The combat seen in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that asymmetric
warfare is the likely style of warfare to be seen in the future. With asymmetric war, diverse
tactics develop that call for different technologies to support those tactics. NATO, with the
exception of the U.S. and to some degree the U.K. and Canada, the European allies are woefully
unprepared for combat as it is seen in Iraq. The key rationale for this is that American defense
contractors are the major players in the field of weapons systems because they have to be. The
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European companies on a whole don’t and therefore are unprepared. The Europeans could
simply buy American made products, but this would not benefit European defense as a
partnership of cooperation would.
With cooperation shaping up to produce tremendous results, the Joint Strike
Fighter provides one example, the question remains whether the U.S. wishes for more
cooperation and a more militarily capable Europe and whether there is the will in Europe to
increase military spending. The foremost worry of the U.S. would be the possible consequences
of a militarized Europe. Two world wars were a consequence of this in the past; however, there
is no indication of this ever happening again in at least the foreseeable future with the advent of
the European Union. With the lead the U.S. possesses in military capability, it is not likely
Europe would be a threat in the future. In the terms of European defense, the U.S. also need not
be concerned as the past fifty years of experience defending Europe would prove invaluable to
European militaries. In short, the U.S. would not lose their position of leadership in European
defense. Nonetheless, the United States must formulate a definitive policy when it considers
European defense and defense cooperation. As for Europe, with the lack of recent (i.e. post 9/11)
combat experience, there is likely no rumbling for change in military doctrine which includes the
defense industry in a manner of speaking. Without the need for cutting edge weapons systems,
the European defense industry will not perceive a need to truly develop along the lines as the
U.S. defense industry has with the introductions of very advanced urban fighting systems
designed to conduct operations against asymmetric threats. One example to alleviate this issue is
to sell products to the U.S. based on U.S. military requirements as BAE Systems of the United
Kingdom has done. To change this environment in Europe would require a policy shift not only
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on defense spending, but on foreign policy as well. The non-involvement and pacifist policies
that characterize much of Europe are a product of as Robert Kagan would call it, living in a
different world, the world of “paradise”. 1
This mentality in Europe has led to the atrophy of the European defense industry,
not to mention the languishing capability of its militaries. This lacking in the capabilities of the
European militaries has placed major undue strains on the NATO military alliance. 2 This was
first observed in the Balkans and has thus resurfaced currently in Afghanistan. 3 It has become a
contentious topic when discussing military operations within the alliance. Afghanistan has
become a hot topic of debate as to who is contributing and who is not. This only adds to the
debate of what should be done about European defense. After 9/11, Europe has ventured into
what Kagan has called the world of “power” in which they have discovered that they are for the
most part woefully unprepared to utilize their militaries in any offensive capability beyond small
unit actions. 4 That is the reason why in Afghanistan, the U.S., U.K. and Canada are deployed in
the most volatile regions. According to the International Security Assistance Force’s website, the
command of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the military forces under that command of
the most dangerous provinces are commanded by the U.S. the U.K. and Canada in areas such as
Helmand, Kandahar, and the areas bordering the tribal areas of Pakistan. 5 This is but one
example of many which provides for a strong argument as to why the European militaries and
their supplying industries need reevaluating; and reevaluating immediately. Not only is this a

1

Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003), 27.
Ibib. 22.
3
Ibib. 20.
4
Ibib. 24.
5
ISAF Regional Command Structure. NATO: International Security Assistance Force. [updated on 2 October 2008.
cited on 3 October 2008.] Available from http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html.
2
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point politics, it is a point of philosophy. To alter the politics, the philosophy must first be
changed.
The difference in the idea of power approaches a point when examining the
various militaries. Some states do not believe in, or are not capable of maintaining, a powerful
military. In this area, power has a very measurable value. Although military power and
effectiveness is always charging and morphing into something not even dreamed of 10 years
prior, by examining what a state has done or not done in terms of military preparedness may
provide insight as to where the state stands on the ideological front of this debate. Several first
world states are resigned to having a marginal military such as Canada and The Netherlands, and
then there are those such as the United Kingdom that undertake on a different approach. The
difference between Holland and the U.K. is the presence, or lack thereof, of a military industrial
base equipped to meet future wars. By examining this area it may reveal that within NATO there
are truly only two interstate military industries of consequence. They are the industries of the
U.S. and the U.K. Other European states such as France and Germany cooperate in defense on
the level of multinational defense companies that produce products for a wide range of buyers.
The U.S. also maintains a wide range of buyers, however, it rarely purchases from foreign
companies; the same for the U.K. The root of these differences is ideological as Kagan has
stated. Power may surface in many forms on the international stage. Military power is what
creates a state’s power on that stage or not. Military power is also a means of not only defense,
but it may be a means to promote values and ideas that have proven to be effective in human
development. With a push by many European states to follow a multilateral path, they are
foregoing the ability to retain military power. This power is not exclusive to those that would use
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it in defense or for good. Without an effective counter-balance to other forces in the world,
Europe relinquishing its military power, relying on the U.S. for defense and not maintaining its
strength, Europe will find itself in a precarious predicament.
Why then will it be necessary for Europe to retain its military power instead of
following the strict path of multilateralism? Some answers to this may be observed in the many
recent failures of multilateralism in dealing with hostile situations. The United Nations Security
Council has not proven to be an effective force in dealing with states that oppose the popular will
of the leading states. The current issues with Iraq and Iran have revealed that inaction is the
common result of most sanctions enacted by the Security Council. United Nations peacekeepers
also failed to prevent Hezbollah from conducting raids into Israel, which is the most recent
example of the current failures of the doctrine of multilateralism on the world level. NATO is in
practice multilateralism; however it is a localized form of it containing states with extremely
similar values, beliefs and cultures. Because of those connections, action is much simpler to
initiate and sustain. In the realm of theory, Realism is the major ideology that would support the
argument presented here. That power, and specifically military power is a paramount concern
and security is the highest priority of the state. Security is the prerequisite for the development of
the human race to the level that many states enjoy today. These first world states came to power
and attained a high level of cultural advancement due to the might of their respective militaries.
The United States, United Kingdom, France Germany, Japan and so forth have all had at times or
still have powerful militaries. Of course, the U.S. is on an entirely different level when speaking
of its military, however, on the second tier, these other states are quite powerful militarily. Also,
all the states mentioned enjoyed half a century of military protection from the threat of
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communism and revolution by left wing extremists by the military power of the United States.
This correlation is a double edged sword, however. There are examples of great military powers
where the societies of those states were oppressed; such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, the importance of military power and its role in the world today cannot be
understated.
The philosophy is that of which Robert Kagan has spoken of. In his book, Of Paradise
and Power, Kagan clearly demonstrates that there exists a major difference between the world
views of America and Europe. This manifests itself in various areas of politics and policy, but
perhaps the most dangerous area it is present in is the area of military policy and affairs. As
stated before, the key to the differences between American and European military power is the
defense industry and the budget allocated to it. However, the main requirement of understanding
what the difference has become is rooted in the differing philosophies. This does not clearly
define the difference in the power disparity in the contesting militaries of industries fully, but it
does provide for the basis for comprehending the genesis of the current issues. Therefore, to
begin the process of delving into the complexities of the change of philosophy that brought about
the change in policy after the recovery of World War II, the philosophy of American policy must
be examined first, as well. The relationship between policy and philosophy on the American
consideration provides for a clear picture as to the advancement of American power in the realm
of military power. Here again, Kagan provides a substantial explanation of this occurrence. At
first impression, it would seem almost bewildering to comprehend the difference in military
power. However, once the differing philosophies are examined and then taken jointly with the
actual defense policies, the predicament becomes more navigable.
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What is the basic description of what these differences are? The fundamental
answer is that the United States maintains such an enormous lead in military power that it would
be near impossible for any state, or group of states, to rival its power projection capability. It is
likely that the European governments understand this and have chosen to focus efforts elsewhere.
This then brings to light the conundrum that faces the issue of European defense; who provides
for it? It is very possible that given a catastrophic war, European states would be able to develop
more formidable militaries, but it is unlikely that another World War would be in the future for
Europe given that tensions are now in the Middle East and East Asia. It is also unlikely that
Europe would get involved in a war unless it is in defense; except for a few exceptions such as
Afghanistan (Iraq does not have the same European involvement as Afghanistan, however, there
are several NATO members that have proven to be formidable fighters). Therefore, as it has been
for fifty years, the United States retains the responsibility for European defense due to the fact
that America possesses the means to conduct such a mission. As the argument here proposes, the
defense industry in the United States is the key to the force multiplying power and technological
supremacy of the American military which allows it to operate at the rate and capability it
maintains. The theory poses that the philosophy of the two parties, Europe and the United States,
were founded and refined during the Cold War which has led to the separate developments of the
two respective defense industries. These industries have a direct and inherent effect on the
military power of its home state. A stronger defense industry provides for a more capable
military as is witnessed with the current state of the U.S. military. The implications of these
effects are world-wide spanning and carry such an importance that it could possibly denote the
rise and or fall of states, the condition of global order and the very fate of mankind. The states
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examined here represent the flag bearers of western civilization and liberal political ideologies.
Given that the majority of the world lives in Kagan’s world of “power” it becomes imperative
that constant examination of military power be performed and assessments made of capability
and its foundations. This examination also takes precedence given the very likely event that
Europe will, or has already, begun to emerge for the world of “paradise”.
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CHAPTER TWO-LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Basis for Defense Cooperation

The theory that is presented in this project hinges upon two theories of
international relations. The two are neo-realism and neo-liberalism. In fact, the basis for the
theory is a blending of these two theories because one alone cannot account for argument in this.
While I have and will use classical realism to explain many policy choices in this project, certain
aspect of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism can add some much needed additional explanation
to various aspects discussed in this project.
First, looking at neo-realism, the subset that can shed some light on this topic is
that of offensive neo-realism. The main tenet here is that "To offensive neo-realists, international
relations is a prisoner's dilemma game. In this era of globalization, the incompatibility of state's
goals and interests enhances the competitive nature of an anarchic system and makes conflict as
inevitable as cooperation. Thus, talk of reducing military budgets at the end of the Cold War was
considered by offensive neo-realists to be pure folly." 6 However, as stated earlier, this cannot
account for all aspects of the argument of this project. Defensive neo-realism can give some
insight in that it is true that the costs of wars can outweigh the benefits in some cases, and that
interdependence and globalization has helped that assertion 7 , but that is about all it can explain
6

John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 211.
7
Ibib.

13

in this context. Counter to the point of not reducing military spending is the argument that
European states "free ride" U.S. military protection. This contradicts the argument presented here
that the international system forces states to maintain reasonable defense spending. While
European states might currently free ride U.S. military protection, this cannot last or be
sustained.
In the neo-liberalism camp, it is neo-liberal institutionalism that helps a great deal
to augment and further justify the research theory of this project. This section on neo-liberalism
takes into account non-state actors. As can been seen in current NATO operations in
Afghanistan, non-state actors have been the current cause of the need to bolster defense
cooperation, procurement and spending because of the particular threat posed by these actors.
However, the use of military force as a "tool of statecraft" should not be declined as neo-liberal
institutionalism argues. Neo-liberals do support multilateralism, which is the key to NATO and
further cooperation among its members. One of the main assertions of this subset of neoliberalism is that "states are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant
actors. States are rational or instrumental actors, always seeking to maximize their interests in all
issues-areas…In this competitive environment, states seek to maximize absolute gains through
cooperation." 8 Through a stronger NATO and European defense structure, a strong environment
of cooperation will achieve the ends to which they seek. A note of caution; the character of a
state's domestic policies is not an indicator for its actions on the world stage. 9
Therefore, the theoretical basis for transatlantic defense project cooperation, to
shore-up the transatlantic military capability gap, has a foundation within realism and stretching
8
9

Ibib. 213.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. The Atlantic Monthly. 266 (2): 36.
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out to neo-realism. It also can take attributes from neo-liberalism. Because the states that
comprise NATO need to work together on projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter, cooperation
is required to maximize their gain in security. NATO will have many challengers in the years to
come in regions like Asia; this will need strong defense cooperation to meet that challenge.
Using these theories a framework can be constructed with the notion that given the security
environment NATO faces, cooperation and multilateralism is required and that a collaboration of
several theories shows that there is a theoretical basis for the research theory presented here.
A History of Cooperation?

The cooperation of defense industries is then imperative to continue to have the
military power to achieve peace and security in the areas of influence of NATO. Fortunately,
there has been a fair amount of cooperation within Europe. The results have been promising.
Such projects as the Eurofighter Typhoon have produced a world class platform that is highly
capable. Although it has yet to be deployed, on paper it will serve its purpose very well. Outside
such examples of cooperation, trans-Atlantic cooperation has been few and far between.
Currently the Joint Strike Fighter program is the only substantial trans-Atlantic initiative in
common defense development. The history of trans-Atlantic cooperation does have a positive
history. Some examples are the P-51 “Mustang”, The M1 Abrams/Leopard Main Battle Tank,
various small arms and the Stryker Infantry Carrier. The history predates World War II, but these
are just a few examples of certain programs that greatly affected the outcomes of battles and
even wars. The P-51 was the warplane that offered the allies a long-range bomber escort that
drastically reduced the loss of American and British long-range bombers over Germany during
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World War II. The strategic bombing campaign proved to be a vital tactic to destroy the Nazi
war machine which could not have been completed without the development of the P-51. Not to
mention that it was perhaps the finest piston powered fighter of all time; if not the best fighter of
all time. The M1 Abrams first saw combat in Iraq during Operation Desert Strom. The
effectiveness of the Abrams with its advanced main gun and optics single handily destroyed the
armored units of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard. In Iraq today, the M1 has proven invaluable to
the infantry involved in extremely difficult urban warfare. Also, the Stryker, a Swiss design, has
demonstrated to be an extremely effective weapon in urban fighting where its superior protection
has saved countless soldiers’ lives. Its mobility and quiet operation has served to enhance the
lethality of its operators. These several examples illustrate that there is a track-record of very
successful trans-Atlantic programs and that tradition needs to continue in the 21st century.
It was no accident that there has been as much cooperation and commonality
between the U.S. and its NATO European allies. The Cold War provided ground on which such
projects could stand. Commonality in terms of ammunition was the most prominent example of
that Cold War doctrine. It was extremely important to have the ability of arm and maintain allied
military forces anywhere Soviet aggression could happen. This is not to say that all weapons
systems were interchangeable, but the likeness among them served a very practical purpose. The
same argument may be used today. From costs stand point to logistical considerations; it makes
good business and practical sense. The lead would be taken by the U.S. defense industry as it
always has been because of the sheer practical field experience of the units used as of late. The
most combat tested weapons systems are of either American design or by joint projects where
the unit is deployed by American combat units. It is necessary to state that European designs are
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not currently adequately tested in combat scenarios. Therefore, if European defense contractors
wish to reap the benefits of trans-Atlantic cooperation they must assume a secondary role
initially to American systems. However, this should not pose a serious problem as it has been
seen in Afghanistan that most European states are not in strong favor of a long operational stay
in the combat zones of Afghanistan. The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New
Zealand forces are those that share the most in common on the weapon systems front and are
also the states that are witnessing the most combat. It would be then wise to at first focus the
trans-Atlantic cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K.
This cooperation is already taking place; however, more is sorely needed. With
the common values held by both states in terms of political and social values, there is currently a
fertile ground for cooperation to occur at an even greater scale then is presently observed. The
political amiability presents itself as a key to this cooperation. The governments of both the
United States and the United Kingdom have many similar viewpoints in terms of foreign military
relations. The Special Operations forces of both the U.S. and the U.K. are considered the finest
in the world. Who is better among the two is up for debate, but the goals, training and working
relationship of the two groups is a prime example of how similar the militaries of the U.S. and
the U.K. are. Because of this special relationship, the test-bed for enhanced cooperation should
be based on U.S. and U.K. past, present and future cooperation. This model may assist and craft
the future of defense cooperation throughout NATO and Major Non-NATO Allies. Also in a
more performance based examination, it would behoove member states to take up more stock in
European-American defense cooperation in that the American designed systems on a whole are
unsurpassed and most effective systems in the properly trained hands. It is common knowledge
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within the defense field that training is everything. No amount of high-tech weaponry will ever
replace proper training. Here again this is where the U.S. and U.K. excel and very often
cooperate. The training regimes of the U.S. and U.K. military forces are so interlinked that many
U.S. practices are modeled off of and improved versions of U.K. methods. Because NATO is an
alliance, there are numerous joint training exercises held every year. However, the original and
basic training other member militaries receive may be very high-quality, there needs to be more
immediate cooperation and reinforcement of the bonds of cooperation while still retaining the
traditions of the many fine and professional militaries of Europe. The cooperation needs to start
at the ground level. To attain that goal, the political aspects of the cooperation need to be address
first. Without exceptional political cooperation, the defense design, training and actual combat
cooperation will not represent its true potential and the capability gap that needs to be at least
somewhat bridge cannot without cooperation. 10

The Differing Environments of the U.S. and Europe

Even with the present state of U.S.-U.K. relations, which are most likely the most
amiable of all U.S.-European relations, the power of the European Union and a new found power
in multi-lateralism has presented a new challenge for any transatlantic policy that requires a
broadening of defensive capabilities. Hanspeter Neuhold has taken this presence of a rift, much
like Kagan has. Although Neuhold would classify Europe more as Mercury than as Venus, he
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states that because of Europe’s trouble recent past and because much of its history has seen wars
on apocalyptic scales that the stance the U.S. takes is not the stance Europe wants to take any
longer. Of course the counter to that is Kagan’s argument. The Europeans did not have to
provide for their own defense during the Cold War so there is no incentive to spend as much or
even two-thirds on a whole what the U.S. spends. Also, there is an argument that the classic
threat to Europe is gone and there needs to be a change within NATO. 11 Neuhold states that “By
contrast, European states tend to adopt a multi-lateral approach to external relations. They are
guided by a comprehensive concept of security, which also emphasizes the economic and
ecological dimensions of international problems. European nations tend to be reluctant to resort
to military force and rely more on political and economic means.” 12 Kagan’s argument also
provides a response here, as well. Because the United States is militarily powerful enough to
defend Europe as well as itself, Europe may be preoccupied with various concerns other than
security. Luckily Europe does not speak with one voice yet, and leaders such as Gordon Brown
and Nicolas Sarkozy have demonstrated that there remains concern over maintaining strong ties
with the United States on military issues. However, more importantly the U.K. is the most
independent member of the European Union as can be seen with its steadfast support of many
U.S. military policies. It is then imperative that the relationship between the U.S. and U.K. form
the basis for the future of trans-Atlantic cooperation because of such critical issues mentioned
before. The world of Venus, or Mercury, that most European live in will not last as long as there
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are states that have no intention of following the lead of the principal states of the world that
have substantiated civilizations best interests at heart.
Scholars that hold similar views to that of Neuhold consistently point out the
argument that the United States wishes to bring terrorists to justice, for example, but does not
participate in many international organizations such as the International Criminal Court. Just as
Kagan has pointed out this is a tactic of the militarily weak European Union. Because many
European states decide to hide behind such multi-lateral organizations, other organizations such
as NATO become weaker. Neuhold contends that the independent actions of the U.S. with
regards to the invasion of Iraq did more to discredit NATO than anything else in recent history;
this assertion is far off base. According to Neuhold “The decline of the Atlantic Alliance had
already set-in in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Although the collective
defense guarantee in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 was invoked for the first time in
history, the USA ignored the assistance offered by its allies…It did not need it, since it preferred
to avoid the complications of another ‘war by committee’.” 13 This statement is highly suspect for
many reasons. The most glaring contradiction is the fact that Article 5 was invoked and the U.S.
did accept allied assistance. It is correct that the U.S. does not always require its NATO allies to
conduct a military operation, it is important to have as many NATO allies on board with the plan
as possible. This allows for even further legitimacy and for assistance in areas where a number of
the specialties of some allied militaries may be of support. The United States does wish its allies
to assist in such operations similar to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. However, when the
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militaries of Europe are lacking in quality when compared to the U.S. military it is difficult to
overlook the power gap and its effects on military operations.
The question of the quality of the European militaries is a complex issue that does
not have a simple answer. Yes, European militaries are modern and posses modern training
regimes. However, when compared to the overall strength and capability of the United States’
military it is truly and unquestionably second-tier. Even with European military capability only
on par for playing only a supporting role it is still capable in its own right. Some would even
suggest that there be a move to reestablish Europe as a global military power. 14 Hans
Morgenthau asked these important questions decades ago during the Cold War. Morgenthau
states “The power of a nation in military terms is also dependent upon the quantity of men and
arms and their distribution among the different branches of the military establishment. A nation
may have a good grasp of technological innovations in warfare. Its military leaders may excel in
the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new techniques of war. Yet such a nation may be
militarily and in consequence, also politically weak if it does not possess a military establishment
that in its overall-all strength and in the strength of its component parts is neither too large nor
too small in view of the tasks it may be called upon to perform.” 15 It would then be accurate to
state that all members of NATO have a duty to maintain their militaries at the highest attainable
levels. According to this measure Europe would then be woefully weak. When there is no threat
of force, there is little incentive for other states of opposing wills to comply if their actions
constitute a threat. As Neuhold remarked on the history of Europe, there are many states today
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with leaders that have no interest in the lessons of World War I or II. Even some states that paid
a large toll in blood during those wars, their governments realize that the world is a chaotic place
where such lessons mean nothing in the face of individual ambition.
Military power according to Morgenthau would be the basis for power on the
stage of foreign affairs. If a state’s military is weak, it then will become politically weak, as well.
The concept of and interpretation of what power in foreign affairs is it is perceived very
differently by Europeans as Kagan has argued. If Europeans view power as the ability to pass
sanctions and verbally condemn wrong-doings and atrocities, then according to the realist view
and Morgenthau’s remarks then the Europeans are rendered weak by their insistence on “war by
committee” policies. Power is not being able to influence sanctions introduced by the United
Nations Security Council. Power is not strict multi-lateralism. Power in foreign affairs is having
both military power and political power. Military power may be a last resort in some ways in
today’s world, but it is an indispensable trait any world leading state should have. Europeans
foregoing this posture only weaken themselves and their allies in the eyes of those states that
would oppose the values that were fought for during both world wars. If there is any lesson to
take away from those wars is that there are always those that will attempt to control and
dominate through oppression and fear. The democracies of North America and Europe won
World War II and the Cold War to preserve those beliefs. To continue defending and promoting
democracy and human rights, Europe must be at the forefront of this charge and it requires a
military balance with Europe’s political power.
With this doctrine, it would appear that the alliance and relationship between the
United States and the United Kingdom would be the example to follow upon which Europe may
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base not only its military advancement but its further political advancement, as well. Scholars
such as Neuhold would disagree and argue that Europe is on the appropriate track as it currently
stands. They would argue in the realist vein that there needs to be a balance of power. Neuhold
proposes a multi-polar world where the European Union would be one of those balances to the
United States as it is a likely candidate. However, Neuhold does concede that the U.K. has a
special relationship that cannot be deterred and that “The platform of common interests is thus
too weak for a serious, concerted challenge to U.S. domination, especially if the U.S.A. offers
any of the challengers a privileged relationship.” 16 The supremacy of U.S. military and political
power is not a force to be contested against as there are challengers that will make advances in
the years to come such as China, India or a resurgent Russia. Europe has a long and productive
history with the United States. If such challengers become a threat, the E.U. would benefit more
with counter-balancing those states rather than the U.S. considering how the cultures and values
of the U.S. and Europe are so intertwined and the basic fact that European philosophy gave rise
to American political philosophy. Neuhold realizes the danger further separation between the
U.S. and Europe could cause. According to Neuhold, the problem is very dire “The present
transatlantic crisis is serious. There is a real danger of growing alienation between the two sides
of the Atlantic. The reasons for this concern are manifold. In addition to the many causes already
mentioned, the geopolitical priorities of the U.S.A. have shifted away from Europe to other parts
of the world.” 17 While it is true that the priorities of the U.S. on the geopolitical scale have
shifted, the interests of Europe do more or less run parallel with that of the U.S. It would be a
catastrophe for the U.S. and Europe counter-balancing each other.
16
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Neuhold does have a number of sound words of advice that may be very
beneficial to heed. Neuhold states “In order to prevent further estrangement and irritations, the
root causes of transatlantic differences would have to be tackled. This would require not only an
intensive dialogue and a mutual readiness to really listen to and understand the other side, but
also considerable efforts both in material and political terms.” 18 This would be an extremely
productive start to mend the relationships that have been strained over that last few years. Since
each side has similar goals, honest talks and dialogue may achieve real progress. However
Neuhold goes on to suggest that “European countries would have to close the military
capabilities gap if they want to be taken seriously by the U.S.A. As already stated, the U.S.
would have to willing to share not only burdens and responsibilities but also leadership.” 19 This
prospect is a much more challenging goal. The resources that are necessary to close the
capability gap would not be agreed upon by all E.U. members. However, partially closing the
gap is much more reasonable. Also, the sharing of military burdens would occur once the
European militaries become more capable. On the leadership issue, the Europeans must prove
that they have the capability and the right to assume more leadership than they have currently.
Although these issues present many future problems they must be addressed, and addressed
expediently.
Based on the direction in which Neuhold was projecting his recommendations for
what the European Union should do, it brings about the issue of the prospect of an actual
increase in European military power. Obviously, this would be a prominent requirement for any
meaningful progress in defense capability and production within the industry. Even being a
18
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cornerstone to the proposed argument for a more powerful and more active European
contribution to NATO and to European defense, the obstacles to this goal seem to have escaped
Neuhold’s reasoning. In his own words, the other focuses that he listed of which the European
states find just as important as military issues will inherently limit the progress to a more
militarily independent Europe. While true and full independence may never be achieved, or
deemed necessary by European governments, the inherent opposition of one approach against the
other is only the beginning in the roadblocks to achieving progress. While Andrew James speaks
of the “Towers of Excellence” and the true ability for progress to take place 20 , the differing
political philosophies threaten all the good that can be done. Denying that the world of “Mars”,
as Kagan would say, does not exist and expecting other states to believe the same is a foolish
course to follow. Since at least the time of ancient Greece the world of power politics and
realism has existed. The Melian Dialogue provides a classic example of this principle. The strong
will do as they will, in the ancient and modern world. It would be folly to think otherwise.
Although the world is now very interdependent, the use of military force is not prohibitive.
Road Blocks to Cooperation

Many roadblocks for cooperation persist, even when the benefits may be seen very
clearly. As noted in a report conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
“Although there are significant economic, political and technological benefits in pursuing
transatlantic defense cooperation, considerable barriers remain. More-over, the mix of incentives
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and risks for governments and business to cooperate varies according to whether the project is
spearheaded by government or industry. Once a decision has been made in favor of a cooperative
program, however, success will depend critically on the ability of both sides to overcome the
wide range of political, legal and technical obstacles.” 21 Finding a viable path to cooperation is
of paramount importance to parties on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and Europe
both would benefit greatly if they were able to successfully come to terms with the various
existing barriers that they encounter and find the will to overcome them. As mentioned, these
barriers are many-fold. Even though the challenges are complex, the price to pay for military
preeminence is well worth the endeavor. Viable and unquestionable military power is perhaps
the most valuable resource on the world stage. With a strong transatlantic defense relationship,
that resource would know no rivals. With the economic strength of both the United States and
Europe, the ability to develop this concept as reality knows no bounds other than ones that are
self instituted.
The decisions to work together may be pursued on several different levels. As
stated in the CSIS report these levels are government-led and industry-led. The government-led
cooperation has, according to the CSIS report, traditionally been focused in several areas of
interest. These areas are: to promote broad national security and foreign policy goals, to
strengthen military coalitions in anticipation of future crises, to strengthen transatlantic relations
and preserve NATO, to encourage Europe to increase its defense investment spending, to pool
scarce resources, to increase stability of a domestic program, to avoid potential leakage of
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technology to hostiles and to retain the ability to act unilaterally. 22 These nine points are, and
should be, the main focus on the government side. Even if they are what the traditional focus has
been, they remain resonably applicable today. The first point is of obvious importance. National
Security issues are of top priority currently, and have always been, even in times of peace. The
advantages of having such a powerful partnership such as NATO are that foreign policy goals, as
well as national security goals may be simpler to achieve if there is a comprehensive network of
states striving together toward the similar goal. Considering how the NATO members all share a
somewhat common culture, it enables defining those goals, and how to proceed achieving them
effectively much simpler when compared to those states not having the many similarities they all
share.
The second point to consider is an existing hot topic among leading NATO
members. A current example is the war in Afghanistan. The coalition has found many weak links
while operating in Afghanistan which has served to highlight a need to shore-up the capabilities
gap. The positive side of the current military coalition is that it does provide greater legitimacy to
the operation and also with the highlighted weaknesses, those weaknesses may now be addressed
and offer greater rationale for stronger cooperation between the U.S. and Europe in the defense
arena. The third point is a familiar selling point that has been challenged many times; the
preservation of NATO. However, the preservation of NATO is a paramount aspect of
transatlantic relations in general. NATO is seen as the adhesive that holds the U.S. and Europe
together. In times of crises, NATO and not economic interdependence will maintain allies at
each other's side. Yet with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO
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continues to serve a forceful and dynamic purpose and perhaps one even more important than its
original mission. The current purpose of NATO as a peacekeeper has shown success at a very
difficult mission. With such operations as the wars in the Balkans and Afghanistan NATO has
demonstrated that it is capable at a new rasison d’etre (with the U.S. at the forefront). Also,
transatlantic relations in general may benefit greatly from a continued strengthening of NATO.
The fourth point to consider is the linchpin of narrowing the capabilities gap
between the U.S. and Europe. The necessity for greater insistence and encouragement of much
more liberal European defense spending is at the core for any cooperation and new defense
policy. As the CSIS report states, there have been numerous instances in the past and currently of
joint programs that have as one of their objectives to promote greater European involvement and
monetary expenditure. However, there also must be the element of inter-European cooperation,
as well. If there is to be any independent European defense policy or projects there must be a
certain degree of European autonomy within the greater transatlantic cooperation scheme. The
fifth point in this consideration is very straight forward. The pooling of scarce resources is an
essential consideration. The CSIS report states that “The United States and Europe have a shared
interest in ensuring defense resources bring maximum benefit. The need to pool defense
resources thus can provide a powerful incentive to seek cooperative solutions and is particularly
appealing for smaller European countries.” 23 With emerging powers such as China and India,
which seek to modernize and expand their militaries, it is imperative that the current alliance of
the United States and Europe continue to cooperate together to ensure continued military
dominance. By ensuring a sizeable and stable pool of defense resources, the current military

23

Ibib.

28

preeminence can remain and develop further to the benefit of all NATO members, large and
small.
Here again, the saving grace of the transatlantic alliance is the shifting role of
NATO. Because the threats that face the U.S. and Europe overtly are currently of an asymmetric
nature, cooperation and imagination are necessary traits that will be called upon to face these
evolving and ever-changing threats. Since NATO has been shifting its purpose for some period,
there should be fewer roadblocks, not more. It is clearly apparent that the United States and
Europe both contribute to this quandary. However, if Europe fell more into line in respect to U.S.
military policy, the roadblocks would lessen. The will and determination to act and provide for a
more robust military capability would be the starting point. However, as mentioned previously,
this is not the current state of affairs. The U.S. has been promoting very broad and clear cut
defense and foreign policy goals. This form of government-led cooperation has for the most part
been one sided with the U.S. assuming one position and Europe undertaking a different one.
There are exceptions, such as the United Kingdom, but it is painfully obvious that the difference
in respect to policy is perhaps the largest government-led-side roadblock. With every problem
there is a solution. Interestingly enough the solution to this roadblock is easily identifiable,
however, difficult to cultivate and maintain. Policy can be easily drawn up. However, persuading
all parties to agree is an entirely other challenge. Herein lays the problem between the U.S. and
Europe that cannot be resolved without an overhaul of priorities and mindsets. While the U.S.
currently continues committed to its foreign and defense policy goals forged in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, Europe remains in their somewhat seemingly unaffected and protected
world while only temporarily venturing into the world scene that the U.S. has been involved in
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since the end of World War II; with Europe acting as a free-rider. 24 Finding a means to reconcile
these two worlds and building a bridge for Europe should be of immense importance in the
policy realm.

Finding New Reasons for Transatlantic Military Cooperation

A dangerous enemy is one that has nothing to lose or one that believes in their
“cause” enough to kill and be killed for it. While some states might hold high the economic
relations they have with Europe, there are currently, and will be more numerous in the future,
alternatives to European money, markets and capital. When that happens, the politics of
economy and multi-lateralism will mean much, much less than they do today. Because of this
reality it becomes necessary for NATO to taken on new roles. The roles that NATO now must
undertake are portrayed currently in Afghanistan. If this is to be the future, along with the
emerging threats of China, India and possibly Russia, the help Europe will need in its defense
industry will be great. Following a course of policies that give powers away to super-national
governments like the United Nations, or super-national organizations like the International
Criminal Court where non-western states have power over the western powers has allowed the
good idea of multi-lateralism to be used as a weapon against the leading states of Europe and
North America. It might seem like an overly dramatic scenario, but the temptation of power will
draw competition from all areas. Without a proper defensive and offensive capability, the last
Ace will not have its desired effect or no effect at all. If this capability gap continues unattended
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due to political incompetence then as James states “The imbalance in European and U.S. military
capabilities has been an issue for NATO throughout its history, but the last decade has seen
mounting concerns that this gap could grow to such an extent that U.S. and European armed
forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate effectively together.” 25 At that point, Europe
will become the weak and will have to suffer what they must and act as the traders and
merchants from the world of “Mercury” that Neuhold had labeled Europe instead of a beacon of
power for good alongside the United States.
It would be fair to question why there should be such importance placed on this
very point, whether or not Europe should stay as it is politically and more importantly here
militarily, or make the changes that will be necessary as the world evolves. James makes the
point that the relationship that binds the United States and most of Europe is being strained by
the lax and almost indifferent attitude of Europe towards its military commitments. This strain as
James states has been ongoing for many decades. However it has not yet snapped. There have
been instances where NATO was thought to be dead, such as the end of the Cold War and the
tensions during the Balkans Wars. More recently the disagreements over Iraq truly tested the
trans-Atlantic relations. To curb such tensions both sides must do more to integrate their idea,
views and of course the military industries. The economies of the U.S. and Europe are already
very interdependent. Between banking, technology and even the automotive industry, the links
that connect the two powers are already well placed. As there always is, the obstacle here is that
of trust. In the world of cars for example, trade secrets are very well protected, but if leaked or
sold do not pose a threat to national security. Same goes for all other non-defense related

25

Ibib. 7.

31

business. Even with the requirement for closer cooperation, there is a limit to how close it can be.
James argues that it needs to be extremely close. With that, the trade secrets of U.S. defense
companies and their advanced technologies would then have to be shared with their European
counterparts. James states “For NATO transformation to be effective, the U.S. must be willing to
trust its European partners by sharing the advances technologies that are critical to
transformation. Moreover, the U.S. government will likely need to reform technology transfer
and export controls if it wishes allies to comparable capabilities. These are big challenges for
policy-makers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.” 26 Indeed these are big challenges.
However, they are challenges that will not be overcome at any time or for any price. Comparable
does not mean equal. The gems of U.S. defense technology, such as the B-2 stealth bomber and
the F-22 air superiority fighter are not items to be shared. Just as the issue with sharing
leadership within NATO always arises, the answer is and should be the same for the very
advanced weapons systems. Trust must be earned. Even then, some systems can never be
exported and shared. If the Europeans want something on the level of the B-2 then they would
need to develop it in house because current U.S. policy will not allow U.S. assistance for the
existing knowledge base. This might seem counterintuitive and counterproductive but the
supremacy of the U.S. military is the highest priority and overrides the great need for more
robust trans-Atlantic defense cooperation.
Here again realism will dictate the course of events. It should be of no surprise
and it should be counted as the right thing to expect. If this one huge obstacle is really the main
point of contention, along with other trust issues, then a strong NATO has but one more reason
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to exist. Only a strong alliance like NATO could ever hope to have its allies work so closely that
an advanced weapon system like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can be shared across the entire
spectrum. Granted the F-35 is not as advanced and lethal as the F-22, it is still the second or third
best warplane in the world. That alone is truly saying something about the lengths the United
States is willing to go to for the sake of better cooperation and better relations. Even with the fact
that the U.S. and the U.K. are very strong allies, the most effective and most powerful military
technology that the U.S. possesses will never find itself in the hands of the British military. The
U.S. would be the first the use its power to help the British military, but the caveat remains; U.S.
military technology of the highest echelon will not be shared. However, some comfort can be
taken in the fact that most European militaries have the military prowess that matches the tasks
that it might perform. Morgenthau states this; and it makes perfect sense. European NATO allies
will not have to maintain a worldwide military presence as the United States. In all reality, they
wouldn’t want to either. Nonetheless, Europe’s commitment to NATO does require a military of
corresponding power. As Morgenthau would say, “not too large or too small” for the tasks and
challenges they might face. As it stands now, Europe is not capable to complete its tasks for
NATO. It is then no wonder that Europe is not given more responsibility within NATO. If the
source of power stems from a state’s military power then the Europeans are extremely weak in
comparison to their ally; the United States. It does not matter that the Cold War is over and
NATO reason for existence is gone; the good that NATO can do for the rest of the world is more
than enough to encourage its members to maintain its might and not languish and fall from
power. The United States is moving away from focusing on Europe and has for some time.
Europe will increasingly find itself on its own. If they wish to maintain the power they possess,
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the quality and quantity of their militaries must transform for the better. The world is full of
differing viewpoints, values and beliefs. However, the one constant is what power is and how it
is utilized. A powerful military demands respect and along with a positive public image will be
sure to guarantee a state’s place in the world.
Given the fact that European militaries will play such a role, cooperation of
defense project, hopefully successful cooperation, will be a cornerstone of future transatlantic
relations. To do this, both the United States and Europe will need to take the necessary steps to
ensure successful cooperation on such projects. These steps, such as formulating a clear and
concise goal for the project, will determine the direction of the project; success or failure in
simple terms. Also, if Europe was more united on defense, along with the U.S. the process would
proceed instead of ending in stagnation; and the U.S. will need to make NATO a more important
priority. 27
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CHAPTER THREE-PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE PROJECT COOPERATION

There are two levels to the concept of transatlantic cooperation to be considered.
One is the ideological and theoretical basis for cooperation, and the other is the actual practical
blueprint of how transatlantic cooperation may operate and how it has already functioned in the
past. The ideological/theoretical aspect of transatlantic cooperation examines the basis for this
cooperation through the lens of theory, in this case realism, in international relations, specifically
between the United States and Europe. The “roadmap” level comprises the actual considerations
and recommendations on what will need to be accomplished to provide a smoother and
encompassing cooperation. It is essential to take in consideration both aspects into account rather
than simply the practical recommendations for policy. The theoretical basis for the importance of
military power and its growth within NATO can illustrate why scarce resources should be
utilized to their utmost in broadening transatlantic defense cooperation. The following is the crux
of the secondary hypothesis; which will show what successful cooperation can do to lessen the
military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies.
Why Military Power

With overwhelmingly many new challenges facing the western world today, soft
power cannot always prevail, nor would it be expedient in the cases in which it can effective.
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However, the soft power of the U.S. and its NATO allies is an amazingly powerful tool that may
be implemented when military might well not suffice. Unfortunately, when dealing with the
various challenges NATO is currently encountering, soft power does not provide the advantages
it occasionally can bring to a situation involving high or low politics. This is not to discredit the
idea of soft power, nonetheless, rather to illustrate that the challenges that are currently on
NATO’s radar require a measured use of force rather than the cultural and economic power of
the western states. It has been clarified what roadblocks are to be encountered in Europe and why
there must be a shift in thought and policy. However, since the soft power of the states in
question is so overwhelmingly glaring, it must be discussed as to why in the current world
climate soft power has serious limitations and why military force is the primary option. Also,
because military force is the principal option, it becomes clear as to why the members of NATO
necessitate a redirection of policy when it pertains to defense. National security matters require
the backing of an impressive defense status. Soft power will not deter states with the willingness
to support terrorism or the terrorists themselves. Nor will it deter war and conflict in the classic
sense.
Soft Power is an intriguing theory in that it may possibly account for various
aspects of inter-state relations that are difficult to accurately grasp and gauge. While new and
innovative positions on theory in international relations are welcome and productive, heavy
emphasis on any form of power and influence other than military may leave a state vulnerable to
other states that are not susceptible to ideological or cultural influence. The population of any
state may be more impressionable than the actual government; meaning that it may be totally
ineffective in many instances. However, just as soft power may be ineffective in many situations,
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so it may as well be with military power. The blunt use of military power is only acceptable in
some circumstances. A far-sighted military is what separates effective and ineffective military
power. The word far-sighted in this context refers to a military which is not simply a blunt
weapon, but a force that possesses the capability to adapt, adjust and overcome situations ranging
from conventional war to asymmetric conflicts. The ability of a military organization to adapt to
the challenges that confront the modern world should be the goal of the military leadership of
any state. What this signifies for NATO, even with its tremendous conventional power, is that
NATO requires smart, accurate and adaptable weapons systems. The United States has
concurrently moved into the arena of the next generation of weapons systems and the European
NATO members are not far behind. Given the current and foreseeable future tactical
environment that NATO finds and will find itself in the ability to be “smart” takes on an entire
new precedence.
Technology may be a double-edged sword. It can immensely augment a military
enabling it to operate with the same lethality of a larger more traditional force but with much less
manpower. However, as seen in current conflicts, there is often no replacement for tangible
soldiers on the ground in the towns, cites and countryside of the battle space. However, with the
proper mixture of technology and manpower, a military force has the capability to achieve an
advantageous balance in which it is capable of operating smarter but also somewhat leaner. The
need for such new technologies, the will and commitment to procure them and the expertise to
implement them, must be at the forefront of policy. Not only within the United States, but
Europe should also consider dedicating resources to “transform” its current military and its
military policy, as well. A transformation to a smarter, leaner and more technologically advanced
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military may hold many benefits for Europe. The U.S. is seeing those benefits in the conflicts
currently taking place. Such benefits are no need of a draft, quicker battles, higher soldier
survival rate and less collateral damage. A smarter military would possess the capability to create
better relations with native inhabitants during low intensity conflict by reducing collateral
damage. This aspect of military transformation is most essential to consider in the current
context of conflict in which NATO is involved. It is but one example of what an advanced and
well-built military is capable of bringing to the table.
First, the U.S. must encourage Europe to assume more control over its own
security. Currently the main protector of Europe remains the United States military. On a basic
level, if Europe were solely responsible for its own defense, it would be more inclined to accept
seriously more the need for an advanced and capable military. While several European states
could better afford to assume such a change from the status quo, it would certainly benefit all of
Europe. While the U.S. would never fully abandon European defense solely to Europe, it is very
likely that Europe could possibly assume the lead role whereby the U.S. could then be of a more
advisory-like role. On many levels this will encourage Europe on both the government and
industry-side to invest and focus acutely on defense. Self-interest will take the lead. The security
dilemma and the many facets of realism can and most certainly will appear thereby compel
Europe to accept the stance much like the U.S. That stance is oppositional to those who would
take advantage of the sinister aspect of human nature. The aspect that Hobbes defined so long in
the past and to this day his advice still rings true. Europe must realize that the world in which
they would prefer to live in does not exist beyond the borders of the western societies. Yet just
across from Spain, Africa remains in a world that many in Europe have not experienced since
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World War II. While European militaries participate in peace operations through the United
Nations, they have not witnessed the world as such since the end of World War II. During the
wars in the Balkans, wars that saw great violence and barbarity, Europe was still not in that
world.
Europe could learn many lessons from the U.S. in this respect. The U.S. has seen
much of war and conflict since the end of World War II, more so than any European state,
including Russia. Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, South America, Central America, Somalia,
Afghanistan and Iraq; the United States has spent over sixty years combating against the
destructive side of human nature. Sixty years of learning lesson after lesson has shaped the U.S.
into what it is today. No other state in the modern world has rushed to the protection of others as
the U.S. has. If Europe would help take on this role, even through NATO as it has in
Afghanistan, it could begin the process of change. In the minds of the people and the policymakers in Europe is where the transformation must first take place. The only means for that to
occur is for Europeans to be fully on the frontlines side by side with their American allies. Fully
is an aspect that cannot be achieved without other aspects. Aspects that must take place
simultaneously. Industry must provide the means for European militaries to keep pace with the
U.S. Once this is accomplished and the governments of Europe stand behind their alliance, then
NATO can truly transform. The citizens of Europe may never alter their minds and may always
hold the U.S. in contempt, but there is the expectation that the governments of the respective
alliance members can discover, a common ground and to not deny the state of the world and the
reality of which we live in. The world that has not changed since the time of Thucydides; a world
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in which men like Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt accepted the
reality and had no illusions about of destruction man is capable of.
If defense and foreign policy can be reconciled in a manner that both the U.S. and
Europe, under the flag of NATO or not, so that there is no illusion as to what must to be
accomplished then other steps may be undertaken to bridge the gap among militaries of the U.S.
and Europe together. Military budgets would be the next objective to undertake; one that Europe
would possibility find the most difficult to accept. How would most European citizens react to
their taxes budgeted more toward defense research and development instead of health care or
unemployment benefits? Not well would be the answer albeit an understatement. Europeans
must then realize that providing for their own defense requires sacrifice. A sacrifice that the
current population cannot seemingly grasp as the generations that experienced the world wars
knew very well. As the populations of Europe become more and more isolated from those
experiences the less they are likely to make such sacrifices. The same may be said for the U.S.
However, when called upon, the majority of Americans will answer the call regardless of the
danger they may encounter. If Europe is incapable of maintaining its own defense, then how can
it be expected to fulfill its role in NATO? The U.S. has been and will become more resentful
because of this lack of actual willingness to sacrifice for others. What will ensue in the world if
those who stand for what is fitting and appropriate do not respond because they rather have a 35hour work week than work five more hours, allowing for increased government revenue which
then can fund their own defense? This may seem overwhelming; however, this is how it can
possibly begin. This is may possibly be how complacency and indifference take root. All parties
in question carry this blame to some degree. No one is without fault. However, change is a real
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possibility. Change for the betterment of freedom and self-determination; if there are those
willing to sacrifice for it.
While this may appear somewhat abstract, it in reality forms the foundations for
the problems that are before the parties in question. This is also incredibly surprising in that not
only are the U.S. and Europe very similar in a multitude of aspects, the basis for much of the
political theory that underlines much of the political policy of the United States is of European
origin. The similarities should be simply nothing but an incentive for the U.S. and Europe to
meet on a common ground much more often than is currently the situation. As William
Hopkinson points out “The transatlantic difference in political and military are in some ways
surprising. The United States and EU are comparable in economic size; the EU has a somewhat
larger population and they have a similar technological base and essentially similar levels of
development. Together they produce approximately 58 percent of global GDP and account for
more than 40 percent of international trade in goods and services. “ 28 Hopkinson lays out the
obvious similarities. But of course, the similarities run much deeper. What is not similar and the
main issue of military capability. Hopkinson makes several important points “With the end of the
Cold War, the nature of security in general and of European security in particular changed, and
there were growing transatlantic divergences over security issues and appropriate responses.
There was little outside threat of the classical to almost any of the countries of the Continent.” 29
Herein lays perhaps one of the major contributing factors as to why Europe will not expend more
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on defense and in general making defense issues more of a priority. Europe faces no classical
threat.
Challenges within the Transatlantic Relationship: U.S. vs. Europe

Just as theory in international relations changes, the threats that are currently
facing the U.S., Europe and NATO have evolved from the oppressing bulwark of the Soviet
Union to more asymmetrical threats and peacekeeping issues. While Hopkinson brushes aside
the ultimate usefulness of the U.S. military in confronting current threats, he neglects to take into
account something that most do: history. Consequently, threats have altered and blunt military
force is not always the most effective tool for the job. However, to discount the deployment of
military force is a titanic error. For example, Hopkins argues the point that “Military power of
the sort the United States now deploys with such superiority will not become redundant.
Although increasing in both relative and absolute terms, American military strength is less likely
to become less and less usable and useful, or the problems that it can be used to resolve will
become a smaller part of the total.” 30 It would be accurate to conclude that a military such as that
of the United States could face the prospect of diminishing returns if all issues and threats could
be dealt with through international bodies such as the United Nations; and that such bodies have
binding authority. However, they do not, and often are inert in most truly difficult situations.
Hopkinson continues with discounting one of the most useful military resources in the American
inventory for either symmetric or asymmetric threats. Hopkinson states that “The marginal utility
of carrier task groups or army divisions above a relatively small number will diminish rapidly,
30
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for the United States is already so much stronger in such things than any conceivable enemy.” 31
Carrier groups are extremely valuable in any circumstance. They allow for the projection of
American military power to reach any part of the globe not only for military action, but also for
humanitarian needs. This may be seen most recently with the crisis in Burma over the summer of
2008. However, in countering asymmetric threats, the ability to have in place a mobile base for
air power, special operations, and electronic surveillance and reconnaissance based at
strategically significant areas is invaluable to an extent that is worth its cost many times over.
For Hopkinson to question that is surprising given his various astute observations elsewhere.
This argument is very similar to another argument that has been raised in the
pursuit to identify the best solution for dealing with asymmetric threats, namely terrorism.
During the 1990s, terrorism was perceived as a crime and treated as such. Today, it is considered
as an act of war. This begs the question: which avenue would net better results? In the world as it
is currently, military response is the most effective for various reasons. The most obvious basis is
that the reach, power and effectiveness of military action are so much more so than that of the
civilian agencies. This is outside the scope of this project; however, it is an interesting aspect of
the larger picture that at least warrants some mention. It is reasoned that the U.S. military is
considerably overly powerful that it is capable of reaching where others cannot, endure what
others cannot endure. This is fundamentally what the U.S. military is designed to do. Its purpose
is to efficiently and effectively achieve its objective, to adapt and overcome. That is rationale
which is the U.S.’s ace. When dealing in the realm of international relations, military power is
the one facet that can tilt the balance. Hopkinson credits what U.S. military power did for
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Europe. “Without U.S. military and economic involvement during World War II and then
throughout the Cold War, Western Europe might well have not emerged from Nazi tyranny or
survived the challenge of Soviet oppression and dictatorship. After World War II, despite history
and internal pressures toward isolationism and unilateralism, the United States played a major
role in making the systems of the world. It was, with some limitations, a multilateral actor.” 32
This is precisely the point in case. The military capability, and the inherent political philosophy
of the U.S., not only allowed for the survival of liberal Western civilization but it also set the
course for the rest of the world for the foreseeable future. Without the military capability of the
U.S., Europe would have fallen during the dark days of World War II. If history is the greatest
teacher, then the usefulness of a military, such as the current one of the United States, should not
be discounted, but central to the foreign policy of the states in question. Threats and enemies will
vary, but without a superior military, security will only be an illusion.
Tying this back to government-side cooperation, Europe must realize that
cooperation on policy is of utmost importance. If not to fulfill their NATO obligations, then to
protect the civilization of which they have been an invaluable component. Hopkinson formulates
yet another astute observation “The United States needs Europe for the same essential reasons
that Europe needs the United States: to help consolidate and safeguard a liberal world orderalthough, to the extent that the application of military force is necessary part of that
safeguarding, Europe also need the United States because it and its component states are not
capable of fighting a serious military campaign away from their own borders.” 33 Here again, the
capability gap is apparent. If Europe deserves a prominent role, and more authority in this realm,
32
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it must accept the steps necessary for their militaries to advance to a level where they are an asset
to U.S. forces, not an encumbrance. If Europe desires to protect its interests, as Hopkinson later
asserts, it will need to forgo the mindset it currently has and adopt a more “American” one.
Prominent works of political theory and history have held that while economic and cultural
power is necessary and useful, it is military power that is the immovable object, the permanent
fixture that requires the due diligence to maintain it at optimum condition. Because in the realm
of international relations, where power and influence are the most valuable currency it is more
prudent to be Athens than Melos. However, for as much as there is agreeability with Hopkinson,
he again states that “The United States, however, has to understand that military hegemony will
not solve the global problems confronting it and that independent thinking by Europeans is not a
hostile act.” 34 The military hegemony of the U.S. is what has sustained the world from a descent
into total chaos and tyranny for more than 60 years. Undeniably, independent thinking by
Europeans is not hostile and ultimately welcomed. U.S. military supremacy is not only
necessary, with the state of the world existing as it does, which may best be conceptualized
through a realist framework, it is for the subsistence of the world. A reluctant and benevolent
leader is superior to any alternative. Would China or India be an alternate state to resort to when
assistance is necessary?
The position of the Unites States being the world’s only super power is that it
possesses the capability to exercise its military projection power to promote its values; it also
provides a deterrent to the forces in the world that would wish to see nothing more than a change
in the status quo. Would Europe really hold the desire to see this evolve? No. Europe holds as
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much stake in the preeminence of American military power as the U.S. This does not suggest
that Europe should play a secondary role rather than as a partner. However, it does suggest that
there is a certain hierarchy in particular areas of the transatlantic relationship. The U.S. need not
be concerned that the EU seeks to counter balance the U.S. While the EU is an economic
powerhouse, and there may be some ill feelings shared by both parties, the U.S. and the EU
maintain the similar position of the world order. Bernard Brown suggests that Europe not need
become a superpower in the identical mode as the U.S. “Is Europe emerging then as a
superpower willing and able to check the United States? Rather than keep readers in suspense, let
me answer the question directly. No. I hasten to add that the increasing integration of Europe
nonetheless is a revolutionary event and has already changed the structure of power on the world
scene. It is not necessary for the EU to become a superpower to play a larger role on the world
scene.” 35 Since procuring a viable path for the U.S. and Europe to cooperate together has proven
elusive, this point is very significant. It is not necessary for Europe to equal the U.S. in terms of
overall strength; or even to some extent measure up to it. For Europe to become a more equal
partner in NATO and the world at large there are measurable steps that need to be considered,
not a full on blitz. With the subject of this project, on defense issues, Europe would only need to
accept and assume a more prominent role, not necessarily develop into the new leader as a
replacement for the U.S. In Europe, defense should be increasingly Europeanized. However, that
may be the only scope where a new, Europe lead should be undertaken.
A common Europe defense is not only hindered by a fractured defense industry
but also by divergent policy goals. Just as with the roadblock in regard to transatlantic
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cooperation, it is also present in inter-European relations. How will Europe overcome the
transatlantic differences and shortfalls if they cannot formulate a viable solution for them at
home? The short answer is that Europe will not be able to successfully complete one without the
other. Brown foresees many problems ahead for the European home aspect in that it will require
some time for policy and actual readiness to fall into place. “To understand why the EEU is not
likely to become a power, much less a superpower, let us look more closely at the plan to create
an autonomous defense force. If all goes according to plan and there are no hitches, the defense
force is intended to enable the EU to wage a Kosovo-like war by 2030. 36 To comment that this is
a serious dilemma is an understatement at best. Kosovo was nothing more than a hiccup when
taken in comparison to other modern war operations such as Iraq or Afghanistan. For Europe to
delay longer than twenty years to reach those forms of operational levels is completely
unacceptable and exceedingly disturbing. Brown would agree with this assertion. He lays out
neatly the numerous issues that demanded to be faced on the world stage. Issues that necessitate
the U.S. and Europe to be in top fighting form if only to dissuade those considered opponents.
“This target date is a measure of the problems ahead. Consider some of the current international
issues: the dangerous turn taken by the Islamic fundamentalist movement, the truculence of the
North Korean regime, continuing instability in some of the former republics of the Soviet Union,
simmering discontent in the Balkans, difficulties confronting the developing countries, and the
list goes on. 37 Considering this particular article was published five years ago and the issues
mentioned remain present only highlights the seriousness of what the U.S., Europe, NATO and
the EU are encountering. Taking into account that concern, 2030 is in the far distant future, and
36
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currently the U.S. is essentially single-handedly facing these issues and threats. Not only is this a
testament to the U.S.’s defense polices, but it is also a poignant realization that the U.S. is
currently solitary; but for how long? Only the U.S.’s European allies can answer that question.
The prospect that Brown has outlined is not only frightening, but also sobering.
This also provides a position for the argument for the supremacy of the U.S. military. If the U.S.
has to basically rely only upon itself for possibly thirty years until some noticeable European
military assistance. Consequently, there should be no denying the fact that for the foreseeable
future the U.S. not only on the self interest level, but to a larger obligation to the world, to not
only maintain but to also advance its military power to levels in which the U.S. is capable of
engaging on multiple fronts as commonplace. As seen currently with large scale military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is presently holding together a two-front war. The
U.S. defense apparatus is initiating measures to ease the strain on its forces by increasing the
magnitude of some of the branches of the armed forces and also pursuing new technologies that
enables it for greater force multipliers. Brown cites a scenario that highlights not only what the
European militaries are unable to do, but also what can possibly be a yardstick to measure when
they have reached a level those militaries should have reached a decade ago. “In terms of its own
stated goal, the EU unaided by the United States will not be able to meet a challenge similar to
that posed by a small state like Serbia for almost three decades. Suppose that Al Qaeda had
struck at European instead of American targets? The EU by itself could not have carried through
a successful campaign to destroy the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, which required the
overthrow of the Taliban regime.” 38 There is no greater example of the ineffectiveness of
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European military power than the Serbian case. It is cited repeatedly because it is quite frankly
embarrassing that states such as France, Germany and the U.K. could not readily be effective
without the assistance of the United States. If Europe is to clear the roadblocks to defense
cooperation, there is not a defining or more prevalent measuring device than that failure.
As is the objective of this project, the solution to this quandary must be either
reshaped or devised. More than likely an entirely new approach for Europe must be fashioned. A
30 year timetable as Brown suggests is unacceptable. Currently, both the U.S. and European
militaries are emerging from the Cold War posture of defensive applications and systems
developed to engage in large-scale conventional battles. The U.S. is currently in the process, and
has been for more than 6 years, augmenting and transforming its military to not only maintain
the ability to engage in a traditional conventional war, but also to have the capability to wage in
confrontation of low intensity asymmetric battles. It is a testament to the effectiveness and
general product quality that many of the old systems were able to shift roles with little to
moderate augmenting. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, when proper tactics are applied, the
weapons systems developed during the 1980s and 1990s continue to be effective today. The
current inventory of the U.S. Army is highly similar to conditions during Kosovo and also the
First Gulf War to an extent. Weapons systems such as the M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley, AH-63
Apache and UH-60 Blackhawk were all developed during the Cold War to encounter the Soviet
Union and have thus proven very effective in low intensity conflict. Effective sufficiently that
there are no planned replacements for any of the mentioned major weapons systems, only
upgrades to implement new technologies in optics, communications fire control and situational
awareness.
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As Brown notes, European militaries are not fairing as well. “Nor is the prospect
bright for the creation even of such a limited force by the target date, or ever. European armed
forces by and large are still organized for cold-war challenges, helping the Americans contain a
massive thrust by the Soviet Union. They still maintain a large amount of outmoded equipment
and deploy troops for static defense. To transform their armed forces into mobile units able to
use advanced technology in coordination with naval and air power would require a doubling of
defense expenditures.” 39 A doubling of defense expenditures is an enormously serious and
drastic proposal; albeit a necessary one. If current France, the leading spender on defense in
Europe, spent over 44 billion Euros on defense in 2007, they would have to spend around 90
billion Euros according to Brown. 40 To convert that figure into U.S. dollars in 2008, it would
roughly be $140 billion. In contrast, the U.S. on 2007, spent $578 billion and it is increasing
every year. 41 In actuality, it would bring Europe’s defense expenditures in line with the U.S.
However, as the CSIS report points out, not only will there need to be an enormous increase in
defense spending in Europe, there will also need to be significant cooperation between the U.S.
and Europe in order that the money spent is disbursed wisely on projects that will be of benefit to
not only European security but also to NATO obligations. The major issue, which is a running
theme in this project, is that there will likely be a lack of political will to enact such change.
The Political Will Needed for Change in Defense Policy
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The will to conduct a major overhaul of European defense concedes down to one
item, money. Clearly it is a fundamentally basic and superficial assertion, but accurate
nonetheless, and provides for a suitable preliminary point to examine the aspect of the political
will. Brown also notes that this is the basic problem. “A start has been made at modernization,
but there is little political will to cut back on generous social welfare programs in order to pay for
defense. As long as the Germans and most other Europeans believe they are relatively secure
under an American military shield, they are tempted to choose a ‘free ride’.” 42 This is painfully a
situation that cannot continue. The U.S. has assumed as the very broad shield of defense for
Europe for approximately 60 years. That shield was and is prepared to encounter any blow from
any direction and enemy. However, Europe no longer can maintain the “free rider” status. The
issue of Europe as a free rider has had several seriously damaging implications. First, it has
created resentment on the part of the United States. The U.S. envisions itself as the military that
has to continually assume, accept, and act not only as the shield, but the spear as well. For this
part, Europe does not appear appreciative for the sacrifices made on their part, considering there
is a major element of self interest in the actions of the U.S., as well. Secondly, Europe has
atrophied in the defense arena. In view of the fact that there was no direct and urgent need, the
European militaries languished in complacency. One only need examine a picture of an
American soldier or Marine and compare it to one of a European soldier of any European state.
The differences are strikingly obvious. While the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism the
United States began to rapidly implement many advanced systems and items throughout its
armed forces. The Army and Marines have experienced the brunt of the fighting (not to mention
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the various Special Operations forces from various coalition countries) and have both seen an
incredibly noticeable transition from legacy equipment, continually highly capable, to cutting
edge items.
In the last several years, the soldiers of the U.S. Army have been assigned
redesigned combat uniforms, new body armor, improved weapons and weapons accessories. The
Marines have also seen these upgrades for their personal equipment. While this may appear to be
semi-trivial, it is very indicative to the mindset of the defense policy in the U.S. compared that of
Europe. Those familiar with defense acquisitions acknowledges that it may be a very slow
process. However, since the need for redesigned and updated equipment was of paramount
necessity for the U.S. given the current combat operations it is engaged in. While most of the
attention is given to the extensive budget and “exciting” systems such as jet fighters and naval
warships, in conflicts large and small, conventional or asymmetrical, the equipment of the actual
war-fighter is an appropriate barometer for how advanced and capable a military is. Given the
fact that training and the determination to win has no replacement, every advantage given the
war-fighter has increased the chances of achievement of the battle objectives. This is such an
overlooked aspect that it is given minimal attention and importance in the mainstream. However,
it is because all these seemingly subtle advantages that the U.S. military on the ground is
overwhelmingly superior to friend and foe alike.
Taking into account that this aspect minimally mentioned because it does not
attract headlines, it should be discussed and addressed when examining how Europe can possibly
close the military capability gap. As this facet is less costly than air power advancements, for
example, it is an easily accessible area. European militaries can easily take a glance at the
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American model of what a modern war-fighter is and needs to formulate a clear roadmap to
advancement in this particular phase. Since it has been established that the political will is not
committed in this area, low cost yet very effective measures such as this could be an attractive
originating point that may see results very quickly. The roadmap would then indicate that
European militaries should initiate it, buy modestly economically speaking. This would most
likely be acceptable to the tax-payers and the governments alike. To place this in perspective,
Europe has independently developed the Eurofighter Typhoon; with each unit costing over $120
million 43 , it operates at the same price level of the more advanced F-22 of the U.S. Air Force.
While there is a need for this system for European air forces, given the current attitude in Europe
on defense, it can be conjectured with a large degree of certainty that there will be more friction
if more spending is called for. Consequently, this is completely at the mercy of European
governments. As one of the roadblocks, defense and foreign policy compatibility requires the
political will and dedication to alter the current status quo of European military capability. How
can this political will be changed? Or can it ever be changed?
The short answer is that not only can the political will to act on defense be
changed; it must be changed for the sake of the transatlantic alliance. As Brown’s timetable of 30
years is a daunting span of time, it may require half that time for the will to transform so that the
defense capability can improve. Although it is beyond the scope of this project, European
governments must consider a shift and adjustment in government funds from social programs to
defense spending. It is not necessary to be a prohibitive amount, but adequately enough to spur
on further spending. Brown’s suggestion of a doubling of spending while necessary cannot be
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take to action in the initially. A deliberate and gradual increase over a span of many years would
be prudent. It is actually fortunate that European militaries are somewhat compact. Because the
European militaries are undersized, it will be less expensive and expedient to outfit each unit
with the appropriate and modern equipment that will be needed. And as budgets grow, the model
provided in the initiation may serve as a template for future acquisitions. However, even with a
superior framework to follow, there remains no incentive other than NATO obligations to shoreup the military capability gap. The preservation of the transatlantic alliance should be more than
sufficient to bring on any action; however, it is unlikely given the track record since the end of
the Cold War with European militaries. Without a clearly defined threat or enemy Europe is less
likely to follow the lead of the United States and initiate a buildup of its military capability.
Given the fact that as the world has changed, as it always does during times of shifting of power,
the end of the Cold War, the nature of threats currently has become elusive not only to identify
but to understand their categorization. Because of these difficulties, it will be exceedingly
challenging for European governments and their leaders to determine justifications in this area
for expanding, updating and strengthening their militaries.
The Changing Nature of Military Threats

In reality, there are numerous threats that are facing the Western world. Europe is
also currently combating alongside the U.S. and recognizing these challenges. However, since
these numerous threats are not of the classic type, they take on a new meaning to those that face
them. That meaning is also dissimilar from alliance member to alliance member. To the United
States, it is war. To Europe it may be seen as something entirely different. Europe has dealt with
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terrorism for an extended period of time. From the U.K. battling the IRA to the French dealing
with Algerian extremists, Europe has witnessed this threat before. That is not to say the U.S. has
not. However, for both parties, what is being seen in Afghanistan is not a law enforcement battle,
but an actual war. To wage a war today, technologically advanced and well informed militaries
are required to combat this threat, not law enforcement agencies that have been deployed in the
past. While still valuable, the principal in this new battle needs to be taken by the military. It may
be difficult also for Europeans to justify acting in Afghanistan other than that it is a NATO
obligation. Europe was not attacked in what precipitated the war in Afghanistan, and through
that, a concentrated effort by the U.S. military to not only improve its existing capabilities, but
also to be flexible and effective in switching from conventional to unconventional roles. It is no
revelation that the U.S. military before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was unquestionably the
most commanding military the world has ever seen, but it lacked certain skill sets. Those skill
sets were that of asymmetric war. This assertion applies only to the military as a whole. There
are various Special Operations units within the U.S. military that are specifically trained in
unconventional warfare and have been operating with that as a prime capability since the 1960s.
However, those units only comprise a minimal percentage of the U.S. military’s combat forces.
The bulk of the combat units continue to maintain conventional war as the standard. This has
been modified since 2001, and the U.S. has become increasingly effective and successful in
facing asymmetric threats. This new focus has prompted a rewriting of the rule book per se as an
entirely updated Counter-Insurgency manual and implemented within the U.S. military in the last
year. The commencement of changing the mindset in Europe would be to begin with Europe
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accepting the reality that there is an ongoing threat to not only themselves, but the world as a
whole.
As part of the equation in the government-led side of the roadblocks, recognizing
the threat will be necessary if further steps are to be taken. This will be particularly one of the
most challenging aspects of changing policy given the fact that it will be problematical for most
European states to concur if there is a direct threat let alone how to deal with it. However, once
again there are lessons that may be learned from history. In this situation, the lessons may derive
from the European-sided debacle during the war in the Balkans. There is no clearer case of
where the Europeans went amiss and the ineffectiveness of their militaries caused not only the
U.S. to assume the effort to bring an end to the violence but also solidifying the U.S. as the only
state that possessed the capability to properly direct a European military effort. “The determining
factor was Europe’s inability to handle the Balkan Crisis on its own. The Europeans
unhesitatingly took on the task of dealing with the Yugoslav problem at the outset. Jacques Poos,
the Luxembourg foreign minister who spoke for Europe during the Luxembourg presidency,
proudly asserted in a phrase that will enter the annals of world diplomacy ‘c’est l’heure des
europeens’…But Europe could not get its political act together.” 44 It was the ideal opportunity
for leading European states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom to assume the
lead in dealing with a conflict within the boundaries of Europe that would have proven that
Europe and the EU would be capable of dealing with military threats. This would not be the case,
however. Rather than it being the hour of Europe, it would be a moment of failure.
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To add insult to injury, the U.S. stepped in and brokered a peace that the
Europeans were unable to do. “It was humiliating that the United Kingdom and France, which
had suffered causalities on the ground in Bosnia, stood by helplessly while the diplomacy of a
strictly European problem was worked out by an American negotiator in the American heartland
with nary a medieval castle or cathedral in sight. Holbrooke exulted that America was the
‘indispensable country’ in view of the European’s inability on their own to agree on goals and
take forceful initiatives.” 45 Considering that the main thrust of the American policy viewpoint of
this project is satisfied in this instance in history, it is unfortunate that Europe could not be the
participant sharing the success from that occurrence. It would have accomplished a great deal not
only politically for Europe on a whole and for their militaries and it would have been an
indispensable victory and morale booster. With the failure of European response to the war in
the Balkans, one of the pillars of the European Union can find its roots in that failure. The
Common Foreign and Security Policy is an attempt for those policies to be created and acted
upon in a more efficient and effect way as compared to prior endeavors. Since that time, the EU
has moved with urgency to enact measures to create a European military policy that has the
ability to respond to such events. Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the
European Union, a common defense and foreign policy apparatus has been implemented from
the beginning.
European Consensus and its Place in Transatlantic Cooperation
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The Saint-Malo summit would possibly be the beginning of true progress of
European defense policy since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. At
this summit, the United Kingdom and France came to an agreement on what would be required
of independent European defense. The key component to not only European defense, but also the
transatlantic relationship has been the United Kingdom. Not only is it a stalwart military power,
it also is the bridge between the U.S. and the remainder of Europe based on the close friendship
of the U.S. and the U.K. As Brown states “In 1998, the British government, after completing a
strategic defense review, decided to reorganize its forces to achieve greater mobility and power
projection and to make a contribution to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Blair
had decided to play a more active role in Europe. Inasmuch as public opinion was not ready to
permit the United Kingdom to enter the common currency zone, defense was a strong card
enabling him to lead in Europe.” 46 The United Kingdom has developed into the cornerstone to
European defense and the transatlantic alliance, a cornerstone that if removed could have
disastrous effects. Not only has the Saint-Malo summit given hope to European defense policy, it
also could signify positive effects for NATO. This was the component of the motives of the
British that “a European policy must be carried out in a way that would strengthen, not weaken,
NATO.” 47 The future of European defense and NATO are not mutually exclusive. More
autonomous or completely autonomous European defense can still transpire with NATO as an
imperative aspect of European and North American defense. There is no basis that the
transatlantic alliance should impede EU led or supplemented European defense policy.
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The most prominent and noteworthy element of that summit was the declaration
that “To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises.” 48 This one statement is perhaps the most significant statement
made by Europeans with reference to European defense since the formation of the EU and the
progression toward European unity. The lesson of the Balkans also stretched the end of the 1990s
at which time the U.S. through NATO led the air war against Serbia. Brown notes that “Prime
Minister Blair was shocked to learn that the United Kingdom could only muster a small force for
the Kosovo war and that the gap between U.S. military technology and that of Europeans was
immense. Even though the American supreme command delivered a victory, the Europeans were
determined never again to be in a position of such manifest inferiority.” 49 This line of
progression during the 1990s was promising. A major security issue had shaken the Europeans
into action. Through this lens, the failure of European military response may be measured as a
necessary failure in order to spur Europe into action to correct the problem. This would
culminate in the European Council meeting in Helsinki, Finland in 1999. At this meeting, goals
for European defense capabilities were set. The current goal is set for 60,000 combat troops to be
deployed for minimally a year, along with much of the supporting units from air to sea power.
This goal may appear to be somewhat a modest one, however, an attainable one, nonetheless.
However, with a refocused drive to independent defense, the inclusion of the United States has
not been forsaken as the U.S. continues to be perceived as an invaluable military partner that can
continually participate in European defense.
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The U.S. has undertaken the mission of European defense for an extensive span of
time and it would be shortsighted to dismiss the U.S. A more feasible option would to consider a
compromise that would grant U.S. inclusion while position Europeans at the forefront. Brown
notes that “Even though the United Kingdom has been leading the charge toward autonomous
defense, it has affirmed at every step of the way that the goal is to relieve the United States of an
unfair burden, increase the European contribution to the common cause, and thereby strengthen
the alliance. Blair has insisted that nothing be done within the EU to cause the United States to
withdraw from the alliance.” 50 A stalwart and more independent, or fully independent EU
defense apparatus does not imply that the U.S. need be sidestepped. Not only will there be a need
for a strong relationship between the U.S. and Europe for proper defense and defense industry
cooperation, it will also be absolutely imperative for the continuation of the transatlantic alliance.
With the gathered experience over many years, NATO and its preservation will be a
consideration in any European defense policy discussion.
It would then appear there is the political will, to some extent, to modify and
implement the lessons learned from the Balkans. The Helsinki Headline goal was the beginning
in which there was a stated objective for European defense policy and capability. Although
nothing more than a rapid reaction force, it is a truly positive step in the right direction that
Europe has no choice but to take. From Helsinki has developed the Berlin-Plus Agreement in
which European militaries may use NATO assets; among other agreements between the EU and
NATO. The will and commitment derives from a desire of independence and not relying on or
having the U.S. either involved or more likely in command of military operations involving
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European militaries. For example, Brown states that “the French have long sought to retain an
American commitment to European defense on European rather than American terms. General
de Gaulle’s explanation of French policy, when he ousted NATO headquarters and American
bases from France in 1966, has remained a central tenet of French diplomacy. ‘My design,’ said
de Gaulle in his memoirs, ‘consists then in disengaging France not from the Atlantic Alliance,
which I intend to maintain as an ultimate safeguard, but from the integration realized through
NATO under American command.” 51 There’s been questioning of American leadership in
Europe, and while Europe may want and need the safeguard of American military protection,
Europe desires to assume the lead in its own defense. This appears nothing but a logical
conclusion on the debate on whether or not Europe possesses the will and commitment to defend
itself with all the responsibility that entails. However, the defense of Europe must logically be on
European terms and not American. While it appears to be a sensible idea, are the Europeans
prepared for not only self-defense, but military operations outside of Europe without American
assistance? The Helsinki goals and the Berlin-Plus agreement are the genesis of what is the long
road to that realization, if by the time it is achieved will the Europeans continue to accept that
responsibility and the cost it asks?
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CHAPTER FOUR-THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN
MILITARIES
European Defense Structures: Progress or Stagnation?

Since the 1999 Helsinki Headline goals were established there has been
measurable progress in the creation of polices and structures to facilitate the growth of a
European military and the advancement of each members militaries. Not only has there been
agencies such as the European Defense Agency established, there have been a number of joint
European defense projects as well as more transatlantic cooperation. Such examples as
previously mentioned are the Joint Strike Fighter, the Stryker IFV and various small arms
systems. The European Defense Agency has stated as its goal that “The Long-Term Vision
report published by the European Defense Agency in October 2006 is designed to serve as a
compass for defense planners as they develop the military capabilities the European Security and
Defense Policy will require over the next twenty years in an increasingly challenging
environment.” 52 This statement alone offers much hope that the will and understanding needed
for European defense is being addressed by Europeans in the proper and in an expedient manner.
The Initial Long-Term Vision Report compiled by the European Defense Agency has laid out the
challenges that face Europe and, surprisingly when viewed from the outside, has addressed the
issues thoroughly and analytically. Firstly, it is interesting to note that within the Report, NATO
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is only mentioned a handful of times. Therefore, before fully delving into the report it must be
noted that whenever examining the military capability, consideration for NATO in any European
defense structure must to be at the forefront. Despite the comprehensive framework within the
Report, consideration for NATO must be a major component of the framework without question.
The transatlantic alliance is likely to face more internal challenges in the near future, just as it did
with Iraq, while the danger of a total breakdown is possible. Goodwill on both sides of the
Atlantic is necessary in order for the relationships to remain positive and accommodating to all
alliance members. Europe must understand that the U.S. respects the advice and counsel of its
European allies. Also, it must be understood that the U.S. must have the assurance that European
militaries are continually prepared and improving to aid in the responsibility they both share to
the world.
It is more realistic to recognize the position of the United States in that for many
decades the U.S. has compensated for and provided for military protection of Europe; not to
mention the Marshall Plan. Is it unreasonable for the U.S. to acknowledge that Europe needs to
be readily, equipped to not only to defend itself while the U.S. is engaged in conflicts around the
world, but to also assist more comprehensively than they have in those conflicts? The counter
argument is that those conflicts are of American design and Europe has no obligation to
participate. Why should European soldiers be placed in harm’s way or money spent on an
American conflict? While it appears to be somewhat off topic initially, these questions and issues
relate directly as to why there must be cooperation in the defense area between the U.S. and
Europe. If there can exist honest cooperation, ties will certainly strengthen and questions such as
these will not appear as critical. They shall most likely fade because there will be more common
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goals and interests the closer the U.S. and Europe become in the defense community. However,
as always, there are thought-provoking challenges. With the EDA extending reassuring
statements and goals, the U.S. continues to acknowledge core problems. Brown’s article was
written before the EDA put out its Long-Term Vision, but his words still ring true in the U.S.
“The American position, as put forward by diplomats and officials, addressed wholly different
concerns. First, they pointed out that, despite the stated intention of the EU to create an
autonomous defense force, there was little evidence that Europeans were increasing their military
budgets in order to modernize their forces and assume responsibility for collective defense.” 53
According to the EDA, from 2005 to 2006, the total defense expenditure of Europe increased
from 193 billion Euros to 201 billion Euros. In comparison, the U.S. increased from 406 billion
Euros to 491 billion Euros. 54 55 From these basic numbers alone, it is crystal clear that Europe is
seriously and dangerously lagging in defense spending even when there have been clear and
encouraging talks emerging from the European Defense Agency.
An unintended consequence of this troubling trend is the direction that the U.S.
has moved in arms research and procurement. The current doctrine of the U.S. military has been
a rapid modernization of the all armed forces. This modernization implies moving away from
Cold War military to a dynamic and rapidly deployable force able to undertake the full spectrum
of modern warfare. From the U.S. Army’s 2007 transformation report, it is apparent that the U.S.
military has advanced considerably in a few short years and has taken the lessons learned and
applied them to future considerations. “Even as the Army continues to fight the current battle, it
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must transform and modernize the force, creating the strategic depth and breadth for readiness,
both now and in the future. Iraq has proven to be a non-linear battlefield, where distinctions
between combatant and noncombatant have blurred as have those between combat and stability
operations, rather than sequential operations, will likely be the rule. Being ready to succeed in
this environment requires Soldiers and leaders who are capable of using all resources at their
disposal. They must be able to use the best and latest equipment available; employing all
capabilities available in a Joint and combined environment.” 56 With the lessons learned in the
current conflicts, the U.S. military has acknowledged that constant modernization and research
and development in the next generation military tools and weapons are imperative to meet the
challenges that current and future conflicts will present. While European military transformation
and modernization goals may be similar, the funding necessary for a successful process is much
greater than what the European states are currently budgeting. The EU as a whole has many
more soldiers, tanks, and combat aircraft than the U.S. However, their spending is less than half
of that of the U.S. There cannot be a clearer implication of misplaced priorities than that
example. Consequently, there can be no other conclusion that based on military budgets alone,
European militaries are not as advanced or as well equipped as the U.S. military.
As part of the EDA’s Long-Term Vision, one of the leading points, just as is for
the U.S., is the rapid acquisition of new technologies and increasing exploration of technology. 57
If there is anything that Europe can learn from the U.S. is that acquiring new and advanced
military technology is expensive and time consuming. A good example of what Europe would
have to accomplish would be to follow through on that key point and develop an aircraft similar
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to the American F-22. While many European states are purchasing superior and modern aircraft
such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the French-built Rafale, they do not compare to the huge
technological advantage the F-22 has over all other current combat aircraft. The F-22’s main
advantage is stealth. That technology is expensive to acquire and maintain. However, the benefits
of that technology on the battlefield are invaluable. Not only will the F-22 be able to attack other
aircraft before it can be seen by its targets, it can also penetrate enemy air defenses to conduct
interdiction missions. Luckily, many European states will be purchasing the F-35 which has fine
stealth capabilities. While this is an excellent starting point, the fact that aircraft such as the
Eurofighter exist and were develop during the same time as the F-22 demonstrates the priorities
of the European militaries which are not in the appropriate position just yet. While Europe may
never match the U.S. in military technology, it may come close by utilizing U.S. defense
development and doctrine as a guide. Yet while comparing the EDA’s Long-Term Vision Report
to either the 2004 or 2007 Army Transformation reports, it is perfectly clear that the EDA has a
strong grasp on what needs to be done. They are quite similar in that both the “Future Force” key
points are almost the equivalent. Not only is this encouraging for Europe, but it is also
encouraging for the U.S. in that there is a good possibility of greater force compatibly for future
operations.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the EDA’s Long-Term Vision Report is a
statement in the introduction on the effect of globalization on military action. This would be a
thoughtful place to begin the analysis of the report as it allows for the consideration of external
non-military actors and influences. “For example, a key hypothesis in what follows is that the
phenomenon known as globalization will continue. It is easy to think of scenarios which might
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invalidate this hypothesis: an uncontrolled pandemic; massive use of weapons of mass
destruction; or perhaps regionalization of the world’s economic system, with competition for
inadequate resources leading to the emergence of mutually suspicious regional blocks. But, so
many stand to gain so much from the continuation of the globalization process that it seems a
reasonable assumption to make, at least for now, about the world in which the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) will operate.” 58 It is accurate that the world is becoming ever-more
interdependent and all out global wars such as World War II are unlikely to occur again;
however, regional wars are taking place right now and will be likely to continue. Such wars have
taken, and are taking place in areas of the world not easily accessible to the U.S. or even Europe
to a certain degree. These wars require a highly mobile force that can be sustained for long
periods of time in harsh environments. It would then seem that the initial vision would be
correct; to assert that expeditionary forces would be the logical progress while moving from a
Cold War, defensive oriented military force. This is exactly what both the EDA and the U.S.
military call for and have been working towards. With the U.S. already well on its way into this
transformation, Europe (the EDA) can learn much from the trials and tribulations of the
American military transformation. The only differing aspect of this item is the differences in
world-views between the U.S. and Europe. This could cause some disagreement on what is
needed militarily. 59
What Will European Militaries be Capable of?
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With the stated goals of the European Defense Agency, the militaries of the
European Union’s members, and in turn most of NATO, should be much more capable of not
only autonomous defense but also the ability to operate without U.S. assistance. Although allied
assistance is always welcomed, the actual capability even if dormant will be a very positive
aspect of this probable transition. The EDA asks this very question of itself; “What do the
changes in the economic, social and military world around us-and those at home-mean for the
future of ESDP operations in, say, 2025?” 60 While the date of 2025 is still troubling, the answer
to this question is that the EU military capability should at least resemble what the U.S. military
is currently at the very least. However, this time-table could be much closer if Europe were to
conduct close and intensive cooperation with the U.S. The U.S. military is currently conducting
operations in many parts of the world in an expeditionary manner and has for the last seven
years. If that is the goal of the EDA, to have European militaries able to conduct such operations,
there is no better answer than to permit the U.S. to assist in cultivating European military
capability further than it has, until Europe can support its defense structure own its own. As the
EDA states, “The typical ESDP crisis management operation will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument. The EU has recognized the need to be a global security actor. For
such purpose it envisages a capability to project forces over strategic distances and to austere
areas of operation.” 61 This statement is a very clear and profound goal of the EU. While this will
assist NATO and the EU alike in reaching this goal, it is an incredibly difficult one to achieve.
Becoming a “security actor” that can operate worldwide is something that only one state is able
to lay claim to: the United States. Even NATO is primarily dependent on the U.S. for its ability
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to act in such places such as Afghanistan. However, as seen in the Balkans during the 1990s,
European militaries were unable to conduct expeditionary style operations within their own
sphere of influence. If NATO's missions will look very similar to the Balkans, as it has been
argued, then a clear goal can be constructed from this argument. 62
The undertaking of providing for power projection to areas such as Central Asia
will necessitate defense spending of enormous proportions. Not only will there be the need of the
weapon systems and transportation ability, there will also be a need for the sustainability of such
forces. Sustainability is one of the key aspects of the reform of the EU’s military capability.
However, to actually achieve such a goal will require more assistance than the EDA has admitted
to. While the bluntness of the goals of the EDA is a hopeful sign for the future, the resources for
such goals might not be available for Europe to attain these goals. Putting that concern aside for
the time being, the path that the EDA outlines is sound even given the obvious obstacles. Perhaps
the saving grace of the EDA’s plan is that Europe is prosperous. With a combined economy as
strong or stronger than that of the U.S., Europe would be able to afford such change. The
changes that will be expensive endeavors are labeled as “the guiding lights” of the development
of European military capabilities. Such expenditures would be able to be predicated if one looks
to the U.S.’s adventures in military reform.
The “guiding lights” come in four varieties; synergy, agility, selectivity and
sustainability. Synergy calls for joint/combined forces that can work efficiently and effective
together; which includes land, sea and air power. The implication of technologically advanced
systems will require a large amount of investment. This investment will be necessary considering
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the changing face of combined arms warfare. The EDA notes these changes, which the U.S. has
pioneered. “The traditional combined-arms warfare can be broadly considered as the
employment of complementary weapon systems to achieve a synergistic effect. Its most
important consequence is to bring about dominance over an opponent at critical time and critical
space. The components of combined-arms warfare have already changed from the traditional
infantry, armor, and artillery mix to other force elements such as combat UAVs, precision
weapons and perhaps more significantly, an ever-increasing array of sophisticated sensors and
command and control systems.” 63 This modernization is the correct path and the EDA has
defined it very well. The synergy is just one aspect of proper planning on the part of the EU. This
can only benefit NATO and will allow for more effective contributions to NATO operations by
the European members. Not only should the goals of the EDA benefit the EU, but also NATO;
just as U.S. military capabilities benefit the U.S. and NATO interests.
Returning to the problem of the will and mindset of the EU, if Europe hopes to
have more of a say and role in its defense, it will need to take the steps outlined by the EDA.
Julian Lindley-French, although highly biased against the U.S., and not much more
complementary on Europe, has one aspect of this problem right: “A change of this nature will
require a significant change in mind-set on the part of Europeans. For too long the EU (and most
of its member states) has been more interested in the institutional/political structures of defense
(that is, a product-led approach) and by and large has ignored the threats (that is, a market-led
approach) that have been steadily increasing in the world beyond the regional organization”. 64
What makes this statement even more riveting is that this article was published in 2002. Now, six
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years later, the situation is the same despite forward and clear thinking by the EDA on what
needs to be done. The inaction of Europe’s leading states in NATO and the ESDP to develop the
military capacity and capability to be an effective security actor has caused rifts in the
transatlantic alliance and resentment on the part of the U.S. The question then becomes: how can
the European Defense Agency spur-on the concepts and proposals they have developed become
reality?
Before the publication of the EDA’s Long-Term Vision Report, the various
militaries of Europe possessed commendable strength; but that strength was mainly confined in
either special operations forces or defensive warfare. A very important point to remember when
comparing European military capability is to remember that the comparison is with the United
States. Stale Ulriksen has made this point to highlight the fact that European militaries would
appear to be less capable. However, that does not mean they are not capable. Ulriksen states that
“The explanation for this perceived weakness is of course that European military capabilities are
constantly compared to those of the United States. Moreover, most of these comparisons have
focused exclusively on the capabilities for wining battles and waging war the American way.” 65
While it might seem an unfair comparison, in reality it is not. European militaries need at least a
measurable amount of parity with the U.S. if they wish to have a larger role in NATO; not to
mention more independent self-defense. Action will need to be expedited; unlike the slow
progress of recent years. 66
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In hindsight, the article by Ulriksen has many errors in comparison. However, his
main idea and concept are on the right path. While European militaries are nothing to take
lightly, to say that they equal the U.S. military in any other way than size is not correct. This
mindset, if prevalent, is not only incorrect but can be very undermining to transatlantic
cooperation. In full disclosure, the particular article was published in 2004. This fact must
remain in constant consideration because much has changed in the U.S. military since then. In
contrast, movement on the EDA’s vision has not in perceivable terms; mainly noticeable by the
defense budget of Europe on a whole in the last few years. Ulriksen gives more credit than is due
to the capability of European militaries; which is evident in the very first paragraph on his
article. Ulriksen asserts that “In fact, except for the United States, no state or alliance can match
EU member states’ capabilities for military power projection. For instance, outside the US Navy,
there are just 12 aircraft carriers in the world in service or being built. Eight of those ships
belong to EU member states.” 67 While that number is impressive relative to the rest of the world,
it is a misleading fact. While EU member might have eight aircraft carries total, with possibly
more on the way, there is no denying the facts that those carriers are not in the same category of
the U.S. carriers. There is a reason they are called super-carriers. The U.S. carriers on average
are two to four times the size of their European counterparts, while carrying two to three times
the number of aircraft. European carriers should be compared to the Amphibious Assault Ships
of the U.S. as they are more comparable. The U.S. Navy operates eleven of these ships with a
new class being built. While the EU members operate carriers with the ability of power
projection, that power is of somewhat modest strength. This assertion is a prime example of the
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mind-set that needs to be changed for Europe to truly achieve the goal it has set for itself in
defense capability.
If one of the primary tenants of the EDA’s Long-Term Vision is to achieve an
effective expeditionary capability, which is a capability of the U.S. military, then such overestimation of abilities must be realized. Numbers can only count for only so much. The focus
should be not only expanding numbers to acceptable levels, but enabling those forces to conduct
missions for which the goal has been stated. That process will require a change in budgetary
policy to allow for more funds to advance the technological envelope. Ulriksen criticizes the
U.S. with what he calls “an idealized American way of war.” 68 He states that this “way of war”
has been a failure and because of that perceived failure Europe should not follow the lead of the
U.S. in defense. However, Ulriksen should have not only taken more factors into account, such
as the history of war in Afghanistan, but that doctrine and tactics, not reliance on technology and
lack of numbers that gave U.S. forces less than what they needed to achieve their objectives. His
article was perhaps premature. The U.S. military has been in the midst of change since the
beginning of this decade. It would be unfair and unwise to critique an ongoing process which is
building exactly the force he slams the U.S. for not having.
The EDA’s Long-Term Vision Report, the Army Transformation Report of 2004
and the Army Modernization Report of 2007 have all stated similar goals and the methods to
achieve them. Ulriksen criticizes the old Cold War military; and rightly so. Unfortunately, he
does not include the plans that the U.S. military has enacted. What he does mention is the
Rumsfeld Doctrine and why it was a failure. However, Ulriksen asserts what the EU should do,
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which not only did the EDA echo two years later, but the U.S. Army stated at the same time as
Ulriksen; not to mention the desire by Rumsfeld to change forces before that as seen in the
cancelling of the Crusader and Comanche programs. Ulriksen also makes the point that European
forces are highly capable in the field of peacekeeping and stability operations. While that may
be, so is the U.S. military. Even with major problems with adjusting the military of the United
States to a post Cold War military, the U.S. has proven that it can conduct such operations that
Ulriksen praises the European for just as well or better than their European cousins. The ability
to not only dominate on the area of warfare, conventional war, but the ability to adjust to new
challenges has been made possible by the resources available to the U.S. military. If European
militaries were given more funds and resources, then according to Ulriksen their already
excellent peacekeeping abilities will only be enhanced. This will not only benefit Europe, but
NATO as well.
The betterment of NATO will mean shared benefits for all member states. Even
Ulriksen concludes that European centric improvements will be best used if integrated within
NATO. He states that “The European Union may have 30 member states by the year 2010. The
integration and standardization of forces from such a large number of states will represent a
substantial challenge. The best solution for Europe to integrate these forces may be to use the
experience and mechanisms of NATO.” 69 i.e. the U.S. military. It would make the transitions
much easier on European militaries if they have a proven framework to follow. Of course, there
are no perfect or complete solutions to shore up the transatlantic military capability gap. There
will be, however, tried and tested doctrines and weapons systems that can provide European
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governments and European defense contractors a very advantageous starting point. European
defense can be independent; however, it cannot be totally divorced from the U.S. military and
NATO. Likewise, while the U.S. military can, will and sometimes rightfully be able to act
unilaterally, it would benefit the U.S. to have its NATO allies standing by its side. There is no
reason, when there is cause for it, which Europe and the U.S. through NATO need to stand alone.
Interestingly, the argument of this project that the key to igniting effective
transatlantic defense cooperation is the United Kingdom; according to Ulriksen, the U.K. is the
key to EU defense consolidation and effectiveness. He remarks that “The bilateral cooperation
between France and Britain is the main engine driving the ESDP. If these two countries succeed
in establishing a European response force ‘able and willing’ to respond to request from the UN in
acute crises, that will mean that the EU has taken an important first step towards operationalizing
the ESS and giving purpose to European military power.” 70 The U.S. and the U.K. will need to
continue their already close defense cooperation despite disagreements on policy. There is too
much to gain to allow issues that can be worked on by both parties to spoil the potential for great
cooperation that can also extend, hopefully, to the rest of Europe through NATO. There will also
be hope for greater cooperation overall if current defense projects that have been developed
jointly prove to be worthwhile and effective in its stated goals (The Joint Strike Fighter being the
most obvious current major transatlantic defense project).
The importance of capability Interoperability
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With the increase of capability when speaking of European militaries, it will be
essential that the ability for diverse and complex systems, doctrines and policies to succeed
together in challenging environments and missions. NATO-EU and internal EU considerations
are interrelated and will play an important role as the EU gains more influence in the defense
arena. 71 Antonio Missiroli speaks directly to this concern. While he would not agree that Europe
should follow a U.S. defense model, he does agree with the fact that Europe cannot match the
U.S. in military power due to various conditions. However, just as explained earlier, there is a
defense capability status that Europe can achieve. Missiroli states that “However, the proper
standard for European defense is not that of the USA: after all, there is not going to be a war
between allies across the Atlantic and, while the surge in US military technology creates
problems of interoperability, the two sides still need to work together and to develop
complementary, rather than parallel, force structures.”72 This particular except reveals a certain
roadblock in terms of desired goals for both the U.S. and Europe in terms of what is required and
what is realistically attainable. While the U.S. and European defensive capabilities should be
complementary, they also need to be independent at the same time. That is why utilizing the
existing force structure of NATO will be a key point in European defense. NATO will be more
significant in this respect as it can provide the coordination for not only Europe, until an EU
structure for force management and control is in place, but also coordination between the U.S.
and European militaries. NATO has been in existence for approximately 60 years with the
explicit duty to provide command and control for transatlantic defense cooperation.
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However, since there will be, at some point, a NATO/U.S. independent, European
military, there will be a need for Europe to develop its defense forces with that in mind; although
there is the possibility that could be overly redundant. 73 That independence will require separate
structures and systems. However that does not imply that they will not be able to complement
NATO or the U.S. In short, those future structures will not be redundant. If the EDA’s goals are
to be met, there must be those structures. Europe will be fortunate in the sense there is at present
a very efficient and effective force transformation framework. This framework will compliment
their goals of providing a technologically advanced expeditionary military capable of operating
independently and capable of sustaining such operations. However, there will be overlapping
capabilities. This will possibly be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. The EU consists of
independent states and because this is not a complete union, similar to the U.S., each state will
possess their own fully functional militaries. Missiroli called these overlaps ‘inevitable
duplications’; he states that “the EU Member States’ forces cannot be considered (nor counted or
treated as) a single unit, like the American ones. There certainly are unnecessary duplications of
capabilities vis-à-vis the USA (especially as far as strategic assets are concerned).” 74 While this
may been perceived as a roadblock, it is an immovable one. There will need to be a workaround
for this issue that can allow for the consequences of redundancy to be mitigated. One possible
solution would be to follow the U.S. model of transformation, which can streamline a military
force. Therefore, pursuing a European military as a single unit should then be considered a moot
point. Each European state will have a fully functioning military; this will not change and should
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not impede European military operations or modernization/transformation to increase its
capability.
Perhaps the most daunting task in terms of policy will not be interstate or
transatlantic tensions; but the budgetary policies of European states. These “sociological/societal
constraints”, as stated by Missiroli, present the largest challenge for actual change in defense
policy. Funds for defense spending will have to battle welfare and social programs for the funds
needed to enact an effective defense systems and policy. There are several factors to this struggle
according to Missiroli. He states that “the sociological/societal constraints that derive in part
from demography (aging societies) and in part from established welfare entitlements.
Overhauling public expenditure and diverting resources, say, from pensions to defense is a
daunting task for political leaders: it takes time and does not bring electoral dividends.” 75 While
there is nothing inherently incorrect, policy wise, with having such programs, it does create a
political environment where changing such policy will possibly bring horrible political
blowback. While this roadblock is fixable, it would be one roadblock that would take an entire
shift in government policy and funding across the entire spectrum of government programs. This
will be even more difficult given the accepted fact, as stated earlier, that there is no current
classical threat to Europe. However, because classical threats are rarer, and are changing in
nature, the threats of today should not be dismissed because they do not resemble the threats of
yesterday. Nonetheless, NATO will remain essential to European defense, even if Europe can
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defend itself independently because of the very examples noted by Missiroli and the argument
that Europeans might want it "both ways". 76
The Funding of European Defense

The process of funding an advanced military may be highly complex and
inefficient. Throwing monies and funding at the defense departments/ministries will not be a
smart plan of action for any state, European or not. There will need to be a clear and concise plan
of action, with clearly stated goals as what must be accomplished. Luckily Europe has such
goals, at least when looking at the goals stated by the European Defense Agency. Without clear
and attainable goals such new spending may be wasted on obsolete projects; such was the case
with the Crusader artillery system. Another possible avenue for improved defense policy in terms
of spending would not only be increasing spending in areas that are essential, based on a working
and effective framework of the U.S. military, but also in closer integration of European
militaries. There is currently an incredibly close relationship among European NATO allies;
however, with closer political integration through the EU it may be possible for pooling, as
Missiroli suggests, at more than one level. The most significant aspect of pooling in relation to
another issue is that of overlapping capabilities.
There are a number of “smaller” members of not only the EU but NATO, as well.
These states, such as The Netherlands and Belgium, cannot be expected to develop militaries that
could be considered rivals to that of the United Kingdom and France. However, they can be
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expected to keep their militaries up to date and more importantly, fill a niche role. Missiroli
argues that “such pooling would be helped by some role specialization for both
capabilities/forces and assets/materiel. This could imply the allocation of specific functional
roles to certain member states, especially (but not exclusively) smaller ones” 77 78 The important
note here, according to Missiroli, is that although there will be duplications of capability, it
nonetheless may improve effectiveness and consolidation of military assets and functions.
Perhaps more importantly to this project is the assertion that Missiroli makes that NATO is
practicing this concept. Since NATO is the linchpin of cooperation, as per this project, here
again, U.S. military policy has shown to be effective. NATO on the whole does resemble the
U.S. military itself. There are various overlaps in capability within the U.S. military; such as the
redundant capabilities of the Army and Marine Corps. However, each branch does contain niche
functions that other branches lack. Such examples are within the Special Operations community
of the U.S. military. The Navy’s SEAL teams specialize in naval based operations, while the
Army’s Special Forces (“Green Berets”) specialize in, among other things, foreign internal
defense. While such units as these cross-train and overlap in their capabilities, there is at least
one area in which they fill a niche role. Just as the Marines specialize in amphibious warfare, the
Army specializes in heavy armor. When examining NATO, niche role players can be seen. This
strategy may be effective in allowing for not only a sharing of responsibility within NATO but
also to allow for greater effectiveness in utilizing role players that are highly trained and
specialized in their particular role.
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NATO, and in turn the U.S. military, has proven that multi-national defense
initiatives can be effective in providing defense obligations. One such example is the NATO
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). Missiroli noted that this approach is a
“method of sharing costs and risks, benefits and facilities-a single budget covered at 11/12
(Britain has a partially distinct position), managed by an ad-hoc agency, with dedicated bases in
Germany and the UK and muitinationally-manned and commonly trained crews-could well apply
to some already existing but still sputtering common European projects” 79 This example is a
clear mark of what can be expected out of an effective European military structure that will be
necessary if the transatlantic military capability gap is to be narrowed to acceptable levels. This
will also allow for a possible framework for the European defense structure. As there will
unquestionably be a need for participation for as many EU members as possible in a Europeanwide effort at a European defense structure, this simple example of how to integrate a
multinational military system into a multinational alliance may provide clues or even better, a
roadway, to achieving the EDA’s goals.
Building an improved multinational effort for defense in Europe does not only
imply cooperation on the actual defense structure level, but also on the industry level. This
roadblock, suggested by the CSIS report on transatlantic cooperation, is of utmost importance.
With the plethora of defense contractors in Europe, it is not difficult to understand why there
may be trouble brewing in European defense procurement. While it is obvious that there will
need to be funds to procure defense systems, there also needs to be a more consolidated base of
contractors; and the products they produce. This jumbled mix of different defense systems has
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further fractured European defense. As compared to the U.S., where a much more consolidated
defense industry exists, "such a system is in place (especially since the industrial consolidation of
the 1990s), the only buyer is the Pentagon and the supply of military equipment is concentrated
in a very limited number of companies, while in the EU the demand is extremely diverse and
supply equally fragmented." 80 This consolidation has allowed for the development and
procurement of some of the finest defense systems in the world. A quick glance at the European
defense market reveals that the major European power, the U.K., Germany, France and Italy, all
have their own robust defense industries supplying their respective militaries with the full
spectrum of defense systems; thus leading to competing defense systems. However, there are
several pan-European defense projects that shine some much needed light on the idea of
European defense supply consolidation.
The European Areonautic Defense and Space Company is a multinational
defense, among other things, company that is the parent company of several multinational
European defense ventures. One such venture is the Eurofighter project; with its first system, the
Eurofighter Typhoon. This aircraft was developed with a pan-European mindset as it was
developed by a group of several European firms; which came together to build an aircraft to
serve European defense in the 21st Century. Eurocopter, whose parent company is EADS, has
also developed a number of defense systems that were born of multinational European
involvement. The majority of helicopters that are not of American build or produced by AgustaWestland in service with European militaries (especially Western European states) are from
Eurocopter programs. Worth noting is the fact that many European militaries also procure many
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American made defense systems that are not only proven, unlike some European systems, but
also have been in European use for decades. While it is highly beneficial for European militaries
to procure European systems, more revenue means more research and development; competition
will always drive innovation and improvements.
European defense companies, although producing capable systems, have not been
as successful as their American counterparts. Because of the differing market environments in
Europe "the share of European armament companies on the international market has decreased
from 56 per cent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 1999, and keeps shrinking. Among the 100 biggest
private defense producers in the world, the 40 top US companies make up 57 per cent of the
market, while the top ten European ones cover just 12 per cent." 81 While there has been progress
on that particular front with numerous orders of the Eurofighter Typhoon, for example, because
of the fragmented nature of the European defense market, true progress is not likely to take place
without consolidation. EADS is a prime example of the consolidation of defense projects in
Europe. However, it must be noted that this is strictly in the arena of Aerospace defense projects.
Nonetheless, for Europe, EADS provides not only hope but a framework for European defense
consolidation. In fact, Missiroli is correct to assert that the NATO AWACS could be used as a
model for defense consolidation because in reality, that is what the NATO AWACS is;
consolidation. With a common structure of command, commonly trained crews and standardized
equipment, it will be feasible to apply this model not only as an example of military
consolidation, but also budgetary and policy-related consolidation.
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It would be feasible to recommend that perhaps the most effective action to take
in regards to European defense planning is to have an over-arching policy that regulates defense
procurement; along with the planning of projects for needed defense systems. Keeping with the
EADS example, it is important to note that the proliferation of the Eurofighter Typhoon is a
prominent example of consolidation on multiple levels. Because of the stated goal of the
Typhoon project, the participating defense contractors (which are a part of EADS) were able to
create a system that would meet the needs of its clients. The consolidated role of that systems
provides a model, along with the Joint Strike Fighter, of how to procure a defense system that is
flexible, able to meet operational requirements set forth by the respective defense agencies and
cost effective because of the system's flexible nature. The importance of flexibility for any
military cannot be understated. For European militaries, and the U.S. military also, it will be vital
on the point of budgetary considerations that the procurement and planning process for military
transformation and modernization take flexibility as absolutely essential. The future of European
defense planning must rest on the mantra of "multi-role". The development of capable multi-role
systems will permit the smaller and less capable European militaries to become more capable,
while limiting the increase needed in defense spending to ensure their own security
independently, and more up to date.
The concept of multi-role defense systems is scarcely a new facet of defense
planning. Interestingly enough the first multi-role aircraft developed by Europeans was the
Tornado, built by Panvia, a joint venture by the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. During the
same period of time, the U.S.'s F-16 was also developed as a light-weight fighter with the multi-
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role capability. This aircraft was also produced in Europe for several NATO members. 82 For
nearly three decades, the need for and the reasoning behind developing flexible cost effective
systems has had a plan in NATO defense planning. While U.S. defense policy and planning
allows for specialization in almost all defense planning areas, European defense policy and
planning has yet to allow for any one state to truly specialize in the same fashion as the U.S.
military has. Therefore, a past example of flexibility will be of benefit to current and future
plans. Here again, the U.S. military has developed many multi-role and multipurpose defense
systems in large quantities to every branch since the ideas for what a 21st century military would
look like became part of the defense planning mindset; first seen after the lessons learned from
the Vietnam War which were given consideration in the development of defense systems. Such
examples of multi-role systems are the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter (in fact most helicopters
can be used in multiple roles), the HMMWV, the Stryker armored vehicle, the F/A-18 Hornet
and Super Hornet, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.
With the U.S. military well versed in the merits of multi-role systems, as
mentioned before, there is an allowance for the implementation of specialized systems. With the
cost of operating a military on par with that of the U.S. clearly prohibitive for any single state,
and even for an organization such as the EU, it will be clearly beneficial for the EU to focus on
cultivating multi-role defense systems which are developed and produced by a consolidated base
of European defense companies. If budgetary concerns are the most difficult to reconcile with
the tax payers, as Missiroli argues, then joint-venture, multi-role systems that have placed
importance not only capability but cost (be it initial procurement costs or life-cycle costs) will be
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the most beneficial path to follow. A suitable combination of following such modernization
doctrine as demonstrated by the U.S. military, combined with the policy and planning based on
the previously stated argument will allow for an amicable compromise of price and capability;
with the added bonus of compatibility with U.S. military capability.
When examining the current state of multi-role capability, Europe does possess
the need history and experience in this area to continue to the future and improve along the way.
The multi-role concept, when taken as an over-arching policy, will need to expand from the
aircraft defense systems to all defense area systems (ground, sea, communications and so on).
European Defense Agency policy will need to reflect this doctrine with the proper policy to
accommodate it. Their long-term vision report does lay the groundwork for this direction in
defense policy. For budgetary purposes, there are several examples of where a streamlining and
cost effective solution can thrive. As noted before, this will be necessary given the likely
occurrence of expensive European social policy not changing. First the fore-mentioned Typhoon
multi-role aircraft was designed as a "swing-role" (multi-role) for the inception of the program.
In monetary/budgetary terms, multi-role is the most cost effective solution. Based on the U.S.
military's current doctrine of "high/low mix" aircraft procurement, the European Typhoon clients
have opted not to buy systems based on that doctrine. Current U.S. high/low mixture is the F-22
(high) and F-35 (low). The total cost of having both systems is considerably high than that of a
multi-role system. Where the combination of the F-22 and F-35 will cost roughly $210
million 83 84 , the Typhoon will cost roughly $120 million. 85 While it cannot be expected that one
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Typhoon will be able to replicate all the capabilities of the two other aircraft, it can do enough to
justify a focus on multi-role for many reasons, let alone the cost efficiency of that purchase.
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CHAPTER FIVE-CONCULSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Military Challenges Europe Will Face

Just as the introduction of the section on the progress of European militaries notes
the challenge of facing a world continuing down the path of globalization, this section addresses
what Europe and the world will look like in the coming decades. Although this is just a forecast,
it speaks to very pressing issues that Europe will face. A quick look over the main topics
illustrate that there are many issues that the EDA has highlighted as factors that will influence
what a European military will look like. The report states that “unless globalization stops or goes
into reverse, the world of 2025 is likely to be more diverse, more interdependent, and even more
unequal…Europe will in particular be held back by low fertility rates…These demographic
trends will have major implications for public finances with increasing health care and pension
costs…Globalization will produce winners and losers…So the prognosis is for tensions and
strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe.” 86 Europe lacks the luxury of being
geographically isolated similar to the U.S. It is therefore likely that Europe can and will be very
close to conflicts in the various hot spots in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.
With that forecast alone, it would appear that not only must Europe have forces
able to defend itself and its borders, but if it wishes to proceed as a peacekeeper in any function it
must take a hard look at what would be needed and what can be afforded in terms of defense and
defense acquisition. This also goes along with the changing trends of what security is and how to
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maintain it. 87 The funding question is one of the largest obstacles to military transformation in
Europe, and the EDA recognizes this. A brief statement on it reveals that the EDA feels that once
there are some clear threats to Europe, the mindset will change. Increasing concern with
homeland security will erode distinctions between what is regarded as the province of ‘defense’
and what of ‘security’, and indeed may call in question the taxpayer’s willingness to fun
‘defense’ if this is seen as wholly concerned with interventions aboard or deterring increasingly
improbable conventional attacks on European territory.” 88 It will not take much for European
sentiment to change if threats begin appearing and are a clear danger to European security. The
U.S. is a perfect example for a change in policy following security threats. In 1997, the U.S.
military expenditure was more than $336 billion; in 2007 the U.S. military expenditure was more
than$546 billion. 89 Both numbers are in 2005 U.S. dollars. While some of that increase is
attributed to two ongoing wars, those wars has prompted the U.S. military to put transformation
in the forefront when the Cold War styled forces showed inadequacies in modern asymmetric
conflicts. Therefore an enormous increase in spending is evident when examining the numbers.
The same may be expected in the future for the European militaries.
The need for such a transformation, and its associated costs, is not lost on the
EDA. As mentioned previously, the EDA has studied the U.S. military and its ongoing
operations and has learned what the future of defense, security and conflict hold in store for
Europe. If Europe wishes to successfully emerge from Kagan’s world of “Paradise” they must
learn the lessons of the combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EDA points to those two
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conflict as proof of the changing nature of warfare. “Allied to this is the widespread perception
that technology is putting into military hands the means to conduct operations with ever greater
precision and restraint. Warfare has been described as a mixture of intelligence and kinetic
energy. The opening campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have confirmed beyond doubt that we
are transitioning from the industrial age to the information age of war-that intelligence (or
knowledge, or information) will become an ever more important resource for successful
operations, whilst kinetic energy has to be applied in ever more precise and limited quantities.” 90
This “Network Centric” style of warfare is exactly how the U.S. has modeled its military.
Information/intelligence is one of, if not the most, valuable asset a military force can have. With
accurate intelligence and ever-more accurate weapons, a military will be more effective in
prosecuting its objectives than ever before in history. However, the cost of such capabilities
becomes prohibitive for many; hence the reasoning for a concentrated focus of defense
cultivation.
A useful example of what the cost of force transformation will entail is the use of
munitions in Kosovo conflict and the operations in Iraq. According to the EDA “in the Kosovo
air war only 15% percent of munitions dropped were ‘smart’, by the 2003 Iraq war, the
proportions between dumb and smart were reversed.” 91 This simple example of the use of more
advanced weaponry can illustrate that given what the EDA calls “24/7 media scrutiny” the need
for such weapons exists. Not only are they needed because of their effectiveness in battle, but
because they reduce greatly the likelihood of collateral damage and civilian casualties. The price
of these weapons is much more than that of “dumb” weapons. However, their need is
90
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unquestionable. Along with that one simple illustration of the change that is needed, the EDA
perceives the focus of its military forces will be preventative in nature because of the sheer force
it commands; which in turn is a deterrent. “Thus the focus of military efforts will shift to
complementing diplomacy in preventing wars from occurring, containing those conflicts that do
occur, and discouraging the emergence of parties whose objective is to contribute to the
generation of a crisis.” 92 The doctrine of overwhelming force remains in play in this strategy. If
the force one has at its disposal is so powerful, it acts as just one reason for many not to
challenge a modern, well equipped and well trained military force.
A productive first step to European military transformation, which will also
require assistance from U.S. defense establishments and the American defense industry, is the
recognition of the state of modern warfare. While conventional state vs. state war may continue
to take place, the sheer deterrent factor that such militaries as the U.S. military possess will make
conventional war a rare occurrence that if initiated could result in the end of the world; just as it
was during the Cold War. Since no one will obviously benefit from that, militaries should not
only focus on their main conventional roles, but also perfect the art of asymmetric warfare. The
EDA’s conclusion is that “In sum, the operations for which European forces should primarily
prepare for the foreseeable future will require force to be applied in opaque circumstances,
against an opponent at pains to conceal himself amongst the civil populations, under tightly
constraining rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.” 93 To conduct such operations, a
complete overhaul of European military systems and establishments is necessary. If the Cold
War is not likely to ever return, then that posture is no longer necessary as the main doctrine of
92
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conducting military operations. European militaries will need to embrace the technology that will
allow for such a force; and prepare for sticker shock.
The driving force behind this shift and the key to a successful transition will be
the embracing of new technologies. The U.S. military is currently on this path and has been for
over a decade. Under the Rumsfeld tenure the U.S. military experienced its principal change
when the Brigade Combat Team organizational doctrine was established as well as a innovative
focus on the idea that a 21st century military needs to be fast, agile and easily deployable. A very
noticeable and somewhat controversial shift away from the Cold War posture of the last fiftyplus years in which the U.S. military was a large and powerful force but not very mobile. Today,
the U.S. military has continued its movement into a more expeditionary force and provides a
perfect example of what a modern military can be. The EDA has thus seen the advantages that
come with being on the cutting-edge of military technology and has stated that “Science and
technology are playing a key part in driving the changing role of military force; and exploitation
of what they have to offer will be a key to successful adaptation to that changing role.” 94 Here is
where cooperation with the U.S. and its defense industry will provide for invaluable benefits. It
would be most difficult for Europe to undertake this process alone. It would not be very prudent
either. The U.S. and Europe are allies within and without NATO. That relationship provides for a
perfect avenue for the sharing and transferring of military research and technology. In the areas
that are most valuable in fighting any type of war, the U.S. maintains the technological lead. If
Europe can come to an agreement to either jointly develop or acquire production licenses for
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such technologies as stealth, i.e. the F-35, then perhaps a portion of the cost could be mitigated
and the 30 year time-table Bernard Brown predicted could be reduced.
Concluding Remarks

The research project has strived to present the case for better and more complete
transatlantic defense cooperation in defense projects. The benefits for more cooperation and the
current benefits of cooperation that is already taking place have been examined; and how those
benefits will contribute to easing the tensions within NATO in the area of capability differences
between the United States and Europe. With three actors, the United States, the European Union
and NATO, acting in each of their own interests, cooperation in defense projects is an elusive
goal with only a handful of successful cases of defense policy cooperation. Based on the needs
and requirements for future military operations, this research project has highlighted the great
disparity of military power between the United States and Europe. To lessen this unfortunate
circumstance, the lessons learned from the case studies examined in this project should be
exported to any project that can, or should, be a cooperative project.
As the European Defense Agency has stated in its Long Term Vision, there will
have to be a strategy to deal with the world how it is, and how it will be. There will need to be a
close relationship with the United States, and the incorporation of NATO wherever possible, to
take on these current and new challenges. A common strategy would be the most beneficial to all
partied involved. A joint strategy that can be acted upon and enforced would be much more of an
effect and legitimacy than several separate strategies. However as it stands, that might be one of
the most challenging aspects of transatlantic cooperation. If there can be a common view then the
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goals and requirements of defense projects and their purpose can be more clear defined; which
has been shown to be one of the keys to a successful defense project. With a clearly defined and
common world-view, and military planning/strategy based on that view, defense projects can
have more incentives built in to them if they have been optimized to meet the requirements for
the world they will operate in. Also, there will be the need for an increase in defense spending on
the part of the European states. Without more of a stake in research and development, and
procurement, there will not be an as equal as possible partnership in defense project cooperation.
The genesis of this research project came from the intriguing fact that while
Europe is an economic powerhouse, a world leader in many aspect of business and technology,
and relatively militarily powerful, it is not on the same footing as the United States in terms of
military power. This can be related to the free-rider effect, or that Europe does not see the same
threats as the United States does. Nonetheless, within Europe there have been strides made to
bridge the gap between the U.S. and Europe in terms of military capability. While it has not been
decided as to which path Europe will take, more independent or more interdependent from the
United States, what is known is that there are many challenges that each party will face. How
those challenges are met is up to speculation. What is not speculation is that there has been a
history of successful defense project cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. Whether for
NATO purposes or national purposes, those successful projects are extremely important to the
future of not only NATO, but the defensive viability of the states involved. There can be more
gained from cooperation, as seen with the F-16 and F-35 program, than will be sacrificed with
accommodating many states in the project. With the project framework that was developed under
the F-16 program, and continued and refined under the F-35 project, hope for future and even
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more successful defense projects is well founded. If policy can be developed to reflect that
success and replicate it in more areas than not only will Europe benefit from greater military
capability, but so will NATO and the United States. With open dialogue, well defined objectives
and honest commitment the framework that has been presented here will serve to not only lessen
the military capability gap between the United States and its European NATO allies, but it will
bring the U.S. and Europe closer together; not only on the government side, but the industry side
as well. This will help insure the future existence of NATO, provide for a united front to face
current and future threats and to allow greater defensive integration and capability.
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